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The signing of the Jumpstart Our Businesses (JOBS) Act on April 5th, 2012 has 
unleashed the potential of crowdfunding for private ventures in the US. The changes on 
regulation imposed by the JOBS Act and the development of online platforms for 
crowdfunding have revealed the potential of crowdfunding as an alternative funding 
mechanism for projects in diverse industries, including real estate. The real estate 
crowdfunding sector will continue to grow, especially since the implementation of Title 
III of the Jobs Act in October 2015, which allows for non-accredited investors to 
participate in the equity crowdfunding industry.  
This research project studies the potential of real estate crowdfunding as an 
alternative financing option for projects related to the equitable and sustainable 
development of urban communities. Specifically, the study is centered on the financing of 
“reasonably affordable” rental ADUs on legacy homeowner properties in East Austin – a 
housing infill model proposed by The Alley Flat Initiative. City of Austin ordinances 
promoting the development of ADUs, approved in November 2015, and an affordability 
crisis connected to rapid growth of the city make the study of financing alternatives for 
affordable ADUs relevant and necessary.    
 vii 
Findings reveal that the real estate equity and peer-to-peer lending crowdfunding 
models, at the time of study, do not offer a convincing alternative for legacy homeowners 
to pursue the development of ADUs in their properties. Major limitations stand in the 
way of a crowdfunded Alley Flat project. However, the research presents 
recommendations that could contribute to more attainable models of crowdfunding 
financing for individual homeowners. 
Relevant terms: Alley Flat Initiative (AFI), Auxiliary Dwelling Units (ADU), 
crowdfunding, crowdlending, peer-to-peer lending, real estate, alternative finance, 
affordable housing, housing finance. 
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What are the potential and limitations of real estate crowdfunding as an 
alternative financing method for promoting the development of affordable accessory 
dwelling units (ADUs) on legacy homeowner properties in neighborhoods of East Austin, 
Texas? 
SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
How do federal and municipal regulations impact crowdsourcing as a 
development tool and ADUs as an affordable housing option?   
What are the key models and primary characteristics of the real estate 
crowdfunding market? 
How should affordable ADUs in Austin take advantage of crowdfunding as an 
alternative financial mechanism for promoting affordable housing? 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RELEVANCE  
 
Auxiliary dwelling units (ADUs) are known by many names: granny flats, in-law 
unit, casita, backyard cottages, secondary dwelling units (SDU), and carriage houses, 
among many others. In essence, ADUs are a form of small, self-contained urban infill 
housing, and can reach up to 1,100 sq ft in area (City of Austin, Ordinance No. 
20151119-080). ADUs share a land parcel with yet function independently from a larger 
single-family unit.  In November 2015, City of Austin loosened its regulations, which 
previously limited the development of ADUs within city limits to an area of 850 sq ft. 
Promoters of the new ordinances highlighted, among other benefits, ADUs as a means of 
catalyzing housing density close to the city core and increasing affordable housing stock. 
Despite these policy advances, to date no incentive programs are in place to guarantee 
affordable rents on existing or future ADUs. 
The Alley Flat Initiative (AFI), a joint collaboration among the University of 
Texas Center for Sustainable Development (CSD), the Guadalupe Neighborhood 
Development Corporation (GNDC), and the Austin Community Design and Development 
Center (ACDDC), has been developing a model for ADU development concerned with 
social equity for renters and owners since 2007. AFI conceives of ADU development as 
an opportunity for lower-income families, historically residing in neighborhoods close to 
Downtown Austin, to secure extra income and accommodate new housing needs as 
family dynamics change.   
In a city with extreme population growth over the past few years, affordability in 
Austin has become a pressing issue. Neighborhoods surrounding downtown, especially 
those where working class and minority population have historically resided, have seen 
great changes in housing cost and composition of communities. East Austin 
neighborhoods in particular became the home to many families that, for generations, have 
lived and worked in the city. Rising cost of living for these legacy homeowners can be 
mitigated by extra rental income stream from an ADU on their properties. Throughout the 
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research, legacy homeowners are defined as families that have been long-time residents 
of urban neighborhoods in Austin. More specifically, the study of legacy homeowners in 
Austin for this study focuses in the neighborhoods of Chestnut, Rosewood, Holly and 
East Cesar Chavez, a more detailed definition of the term can be found in the glossary.  
AFI projects, then, enable families to add value to their property and remain in 
their neighborhoods. The AFI program does this by requiring landlord-owners to rent 
ADUs according to the affordability measures set by City of Austin’s Safe, Mixed 
Income, Accessible, Reasonably Priced, and Transit Oriented (S.M.A.R.T) Housing 
program, designed to promote housing affordability in the city’s core. The outcome of the 
AFI program is twofold: it increases housing affordability for landlord-homeowners and 
for ADU tenants. 
Financing the construction of an ADU in Austin is not easy for a property owner 
who already struggles with the affordability of his or her property. Traditional lending 
mechanisms do not appropriately recognize ADUs when assessing property value. In 
addition, property owners with affordability issues are not likely to be in a position where 
their personal finance or property equity will pre-qualify them relative to traditional 
lending approval standards.   
The City of Austin’s loosening of regulations around the development of ADUs is 
forecast to increase the number of ADUs developed in the permitted areas. Under current 
financing structures, however, this increase will likely to be led by market-driven 
development that takes better advantage and maximizes the benefits of the new 
regulations. Real estate developers and property owners with enough equity to access 
traditional lending programs will therefore lead the development of ADUs. As a result, 
their units are not likely to be envisioned as part of a comprehensive effort to increase 
Austin’s housing affordability.  
This study explores the potential of real estate equity crowdfunding as an 
alternative mechanism for addressing the financing access gap for property owners who 
do not qualify for traditional lending structures. This research is relevant because it 
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addresses issues of social equity for long-time residents and homeowners with 
limited income who are being forced by market dynamics to leave their communities 
and relocate. The research embraces the AFI model for the potential social equity 
outcomes of Alley Flats: these types of ADUs built on legacy homeowner properties 
service the preservation of communities and provide affordable housing stock in the 
city’s core. The promise of the AFI is tied to alleviating the financial stress a legacy 
homeowner would have to incur in order to build an ADU in his or her property by 
providing discounted design services and expedited permitting processes. The limited 
number of Alley Flats built to date suggests that financing tools and programs to 
encourage the building of ADUs under the AFI model are not yet in place.  
The financial burdens associated with building an ADU and limited access to 
traditional lending tools by legacy homeowners are important factors limiting the 
applicability of the AFI model at its fullest. Without appropriate financing tools and 
programs aimed at legacy homeowners to guarantee housing affordability for property 
owners and renters alike, the AFI model will not become commonplace in Austin. The 
results of this research demonstrate that equity and peer-to-peer lending crowdfunding 
models have no potential impact at becoming tools for addressing the issue of financing 
ADUs under the AFI model—at least not without complementary policies or programs 
that incentivize and promote this ADU development model. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
 
A pragmatic, mixed-methods research design guides this study. A pragmatic 
approach to research calls for implementing the method or methods that appear to be 
most appropriate to answer the research question (Groat et al., 2002). The research 
project seeks to judge the degree of change by which crowdfunding in real estate can 
stimulate the development of more affordable housing urban infill projects, in the form of 
ADUs under the AFI model. In doing so, the researcher acknowledges that context 
varies: conditions are always subject to change and reality is imperfectly apprehensible. 
Just as conditions change, the tools to measure the variables affecting realities must also 
adapt.   
The mixed methods approach to research allows for empirical data to be obtained 
by merging qualitative and quantitative methods. This research project combines 
elements from a literature review with field research, data analysis, and opinions and 
experiences gathered from stakeholders in the development of ADU units in Austin.  
• In Chapter 1, a literature review of relevant terms related to real estate development, 
crowdfunding, and auxiliary dwelling units in Austin are presented and defined.  
• In Chapter 2, due to the lack of relevant data available for such an emerging financing 
product, the data presented was gathered from three different real estate 
crowdfunding platforms. Data from publicly available investment products in each 
crowdfunding platform was manually recorded. The surveying of existing products in 
these platforms allowed for the creation of a database containing relevant fields of 
information related to the products encountered.  
• In Chapter 3, the assumptions for the financing modeling of an Alley Flat 
development are presented. Assumptions are based on hard data from existing 
databases and from knowledge shared by relevant stakeholders in (1) the AFI model, 
(2) experts in the local real estate lending market and (3) those involved in the real 
estate crowdfunding industry. Methods of engagement with stakeholders varied from 
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informal in-person and telephone interviews and through email exchanges. Literature 
and expert sources complement each other and allow for triangulation of sources 
(Groat and Wang, 2002). While existing information sources shaped the study’s 
initial assumptions, consulting with those involved in the local real estate 
development industry provides valuable perspectives that have adjusted those 
assumptions.  
• In Chapter 4, the study’s key assumptions are entered into a financing proforma for 
the development of an ADU under the AFI model. Assumptions for the crowdfunding 
finance scenario are based upon data presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The 
results of the financing scenario are analyzed beyond their quantitative outcomes, and 
include qualitative recommendations for programs and policies that could increase the 
potential of crowdfunding as a tool for the development of ADUs under the AFI.. 
• Both crowdfunding and ADUs are relatively recent concepts in crowdfunding finance 
and residential real estate development. During the course of research significant 
changes in matters affecting these subjects, in regards to the crowdfunding industry in 
particular, influenced the initial research design. For instance, once the platform 
surveying was completed, regulations ruling over equity crowdfunding allowed for 
non-accredited investors to participate in these products. With this change, many 
platforms began allowing public access to the information on their investment 
products. Before regulatory changes, only certain platforms allowed for public access 
to a limited number of their offerings.  In consequence, the analysis of platforms in 
this research was limited by data accessibility. Further changes in policies and 
regulations over the crowdfunding industry and ADU development are to be expected 
and the findings of this research must be reinterpreted in the light of future 
conditions.  
The study recognizes the existing dominant paradigms in the real estate 
development industry for urban areas. At the same time, it recognizes the need for more 
and better public spaces, buildings, and services in urban areas – focusing on ADU units 
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in the context of Austin, Texas. Real estate crowdfunding is conceived as a paradigm that 
challenges the dominant methodologies and interests behind conventional funding for 
real estate development.  
In the study’s interest of influencing design and development practices, it 
embraces the notion of Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm shifts in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962). Real estate equity crowdfunding is conceived as a factor contributing 
to a paradigm shift within the interests driving real estate development in urban America 
– from private and ambiguous interests towards a more grassroots and transparent public-
private approach to development. In other words, the study considers if real estate 
crowdfunding, as part of a shared economy, alters the status quo of real estate 
development and shapes it according to the investment preferences of those choosing to 
crowd fund specific product types. A real estate shared economy is assumed to result in 
more socially just and equity-driven investment industry—the interests of local 
communities could drive, to a certain degree, real estate development. Crowdfunding 
models that finance real estate development can potentially create feedback loops 
between the demand of development products by the community and the industry’s 
supply of them. The community—the “crowd” itself—funds projects. In turn, a more 
sustainable real estate economy is created, possibly one with a stronger linkage to social 
equity outcomes—assuming that local demand and investment interests will favor such 
social outcomes in the first place. While, in concept, the shared economy of 
crowdfunding and its promotion of community development is promising (Davies, 2015), 
the findings of this research call into question the promise of real estate crowdfunding to 
be a driving force for affordable housing development, specifically in the form of ad-hoc 
development of Alley Flats in Austin, Texas. 
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
FINANCE ECONOMICS  
In order to understand the implications of real estate as a driver of economic 
development in a community, one must first generally understand the components and 
concepts behind financial economics. Financial economics can be defined as a discipline 
within economics dedicated to the study and analysis of capital markets. Capital markets 
are made up of assets. Assets hold potential future benefits measured in monetary terms. 
The content of this brief overview on finance economics relies heavily on the work of 
Geltner and Miller (2001) and is relevant in order to place the crowdfunding investment 
market for real estate in context relative to existing investment products in the industry. 
Capital markets would not function without investors. They are the fuel of the market: 
investors buy and sell assets. Geltner and Miller (2001) highlight the importance of 
investor heterogeneity in financial economics. In short, investor heterogeneity is based 
upon the principle establishing that because investors vary so much in their investment 
objectives and expected returns, the market flourishes. The demand raised by the 
diversity of expectations is to be served by the supply of many different investment 
products that the market can offer.  
The market can offer many different kinds of investment products and vehicles. The main 
factors differentiating one investment product from another one are risk, liquidity and 
capital constraint. Risk can be defined as the variation and unpredictability of the 
performance of an asset. Liquidity, on the other hand, represents the limitation on the 
ability to sell an asset quickly at its full value. The capital constraint is a limitation related 
to the magnitude of the investment – how much capital is needed and whether it is an 
attainable investment by the measure of an investor’s available capital.  
Other factors related to the investor can influence the appeal and performance of an 
investment. Investors can have either growth or income objectives (Geltner and Miller, 
2001). The difference between growth and income objectives is in the gain expectation: 
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growth is related to long-tem gain and income to shorter-term gain. Investor-related 
factors in the performance and appeal of an investment product also include the expertise 
of the investor and the investment’s management burden. In other words, performance is 
linked to the investor’s knowledge about the capital market and how much work the 
investment will require from the investor. Investment size is also an important factor to 
consider, shaped by the kind of capital the investor is able and willing to contribute.  
The heterogeneity of investors is not only informed by the diverse factors affecting the 
performance of an investment product. The investment universe allows for a variety of 
asset types, which, in turn, attract the attention of specific investors who align asset fits to 
their own interests and objectives. Four major assets are available in the investment 
universe: cash (properly known as Treasury Bills), stocks, bonds and real estate (Geltner 
and Miller, 2001). 
Traditionally, stocks and bonds have been the mainstream asset typologies in the 
investment and corporate finance sectors in the US during the 19th century (Geltner and 
Miller, 2001). In recent years, additional layers and investment product types have been 
developed based on the main four asset types. Real estate investment has not been absent 
from the development of new investment products within the traditional asset types.  In 
fact, real estate investment has evolved to become one of the most interesting and 
complex markets in the last decades. The real estate crowdfunding sector, then, is one 
segment of emerging investment products available to investors interested in the real 
estate investment industry. 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT INDUSTRY 
 When compared to the other major asset classes, real estate can be considered 
similar in returns performance and investment risks of a long-term bond. Different from 
bonds, real estate generally provides good growth and investment inflation protection 
(Geltner and Miller, 2001) because the performance of real estate can fluctuate in 
reaction to market forces and economic trends. While returns for real estate investment 
are not as high as the stock market, real estate investments are considerably less risky 
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than stock market investments. In relationship to the other three major asset classes, real 
estate can be considered a conservative, low risk investment with intermediate returns 
and good long-term growth and liquidity.  
One major difference between real estate assets and the other major asset classes 
is that the real estate market is backed up by real, built structures – buildings and 
properties. Other asset classes besides real estate are financial products devised by 
corporations and financial institutions based on underlying assets that are often 
intangible, unlike real estate assets. In effect, the physicality of assets that underlie real 
estate investments provides a degree of certainty to the real estate market compared to 
other asset classes.  
The fact that real estate’s underlying assets are built physical structures points to 
another unique feature of real estate as an asset class. Generally, other asset classes are 
traded in public markets; real estate is traded, however, in both the public and private 
market. The underlying assets and properties are traded in the private market, and real 
estate properties are exchanged among owners or investment groups. As a result, only 
those investors with enough capital to participate in commercial real estate deals can 
directly participate in the private real estate market. Traditionally, access to the real estate 
market, particularly in the form of commercial real estate ownership, was limited to those 
with enough capital, investment experience and management capacity.  
Recent decades have witnessed a shift, whereby real estate’s narrow access has 
been broadened by the evolution of publicly-traded real estate markets. A number of new 
financial products have enabled passive investors, those not interested in being deeply 
involved in the management of the underlying assets, to actively participate in the real 
estate investment industry. In many ways, the differences between the stock and real 
estate markets have been blurred by the development of these new financial products 
(Geltner and Miller, 2001). In Chapter 2, the analysis of real estate crowdfunding 
platforms will reveal how they provide opportunities for passive investors and ad-hoc real 
estate developers.  
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 One example of a publicly traded real estate financial product are REITs (Real 
Estate Investment Trusts/Funds). REITs are equity investments. Large investing groups 
build up real estate portfolios with numerous and various property types and locations.  
REITs are sold on the public market, therefore, enabling small investors to buy shares of 
the portfolio. Another example of real estate public investment products are CMBS 
(Commercial Mortgage-backed Securities). Just like REITs, CMBS allow small investors 
to participate in the real estate investment industry. However, CMB’s underlying assets 
are not properties, but debt issued on real estate developments. In peer-to-peer lending, 
also known as crowdlending, products, see Chapter 2, investors collectively fund loans 
for real-estate developers.  
In the case of both investment products, investors are not required to directly 
participate in the management of the real estate underlying assets. Even more important, 
REITs are an example of how publicly-traded real estate products allow small investors 
to participate in and benefit from a market typically reserved for large investors. Equity 
investment in real estate “stocks”, such as REITs and CMBs, is interesting due to the 
financial performance of underlying assets. Compared to real estate assets, which can be 
considered moderate risk assets, a corporation’s stock values, and, therefore, its returns, 
are constantly fluctuating and dependent on a number of varying factors, which increase 
their risk profile. The financial projections of real estate properties are therefore more 
predictable and stable than those of traditional stock market assets. Very generally, the 
income and expenses of real estate properties follow anticipated middle to long-term 
cycles. These dynamics characterize investment in public market financial products by 
low to middle investment risks and moderate returns.  
Not even the residential real estate crisis of 2007 radically affected REITs 
suggested by the fact that only one went bankrupt during that period (Grout, 2014). 
Generally speaking, whereas the performance of a tech company’s stock depends upon 
the release and success of a groundbreaking device, or the decisions of its board of 
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directors, a real estate asset’s expected financial performance depends on occupancy and 
the quality of property management. 
Government policy and regulation changes can be directly linked to the 
diversification of the real estate investment industry into an increasingly publicly traded 
asset class. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, tax reforms allowing institutional 
investors to participate in the commercial real estate market permitted financial products 
such as REITs to surge and become a major real estate product. These dynamics had 
unprecedented effects, as never before in US history had there been large properties of 
commercial real estate transferred from private ownership to publicly traded real estate 
corporations (Geltner and Miller, 2001). The co-existence of a CMB market and the 
enactment of FIRREA (Financial Institutions Recovery and Enforcement Act) fanned 
such transfers. Established in 1989, FIRREA was designed to bail out the savings and 
loans industry from their greatest crisis by auctioning low performing commercial real 
estate projects linked to the savings and loans industry. In doing so, the Act resulted in 
the issuing of large numbers of commercial real estate properties and their respective debt 
to the public market. The JOBS Act may result in a similar democratization of the real 
estate investment market. The 2012 JOBS Act, with its parallel support for small business 
funding mechanisms, provides the regulatory framework for the rise of real estate 
crowdfunding as a growing asset class within the industry.  By making real estate assets, 
be it via equity or peer lending platforms, crowdfunding is effectively providing all 
investors with access to platforms with opportunities to participate in the real estate 
investment market.  
THE JOBS ACT 
Recent regulation changes together with digital technology, namely the Internet, 
are the leading factors driving the evolution of new real estate financial products. On 
April 5th, 2012, the Jumpstart Our Businesses Act (JOBS Act) was voted into law by 
Congress and signed by President Barack Obama. Enacted to revise the regulatory 
framework around small businesses and funding mechanisms available to growing 
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companies, the JOBS Act has since,attracted much attention and discussion because of its 
core principles and consequent new regulations related to crowdfunding.  
Owing to the implementation of rulings for Title III of the JOBS Act, as of 
October 30th, 2015 crowdfunding from accredited and non-accredited individuals became 
legal. Before Title III was passed, equity crowdfunding was largely limited to accredited 
investors only. Through the gradual implementation of new rules, local business, start-
ups and entrepreneurs will be able to fund their enterprises and ideas by appealing to the 
general public - within certain parameters. 
As the regulatory framework for Title III is undergoing implementation, online 
services are developing in order to provide platforms that foster exchange among 
entrepreneurs, innovators, and start-up capital. Another factor affecting the 
implementation of crowdfunding is state legislation. Through the design and 
implementation of Title III regulations, equity crowdfunding was enabled only by states, 
which in turn established exemptions within federal law to allow small businesses and 
entrepreneurs to tap into the equity crowdfunding sector (NASAA, 2015). According to 
the North American Securities Administration Association, as August 2015, twenty-one 
states had active equity crowdfunding exemptions, seven had exemptions soon to be 
implemented, eight had legislation pending, two were investigating, and only two states 
had voted against implementing state equity crowdfunding exemptions. At that time, only 
ten states had not engaged in the debate about enacting equity crowdfunding exemptions 
within state jurisdiction. Crowdfunding platforms have not been slow to catch-up to the 
legislative exemptions, and continuously boast intra-state deals and expand to become 
approved entities in states with equity crowdfunding legislation in place.  
Before further discussing the implications of the JOBS Act on crowdfunding, 
first, it is important to define the term. Crowdfunding is defined as financial contributions 
from online investors, sponsors or donors to finance for-profit or non-profit initiatives or 
enterprises (Crowdsourcing 2011). Crowdfunding adopts four main types of funding 
models: donations, reward-based, equity, and lending. Considered the patron-models of 
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crowdfunding, donation and reward-based are philanthropic initiatives by individual 
investors in which no financial returns are expected. Alternatively, the last two types 
involve lending or investment in exchange for equity, profit sharing, or debt instruments.  
Typically, social impact enterprises rely on crowdfunding in the form of 
donations through which investors fund an initiative without expecting future reward or 
return. Many arts and technology ventures have setup reward-based, sponsorship type 
crowdfunding models, such as those offered in Kickstarter or IndieGoGo. Reward-based 
crowdfunding sets funding milestones by which different rewards are assigned relative to 
the donated amount. Rewards include but are not limited to early prototypes of the 
product, special recognition, or credit upon project completion. Generally, a funding goal 
and campaign length are established prior to kicking off the effort. If the funding goal is 
not achieved, the capital is returned to the investors. Before the JOBS Act came into 
effect, businesses and organizations were limited to crowdfunding in the form of 
donations or reward-based campaigns.  
Equity and debt-based crowdfunding are more complex financial mechanisms. 
Every platform offering equity and peer-to-peer lending does so under their own business 
models. In contrast to reward-based crowdfunding, investors in equity crowdfunding are 
given equity in the company or venture they are funding. By investing in equity, the 
investor owns a portion of the business or venture and will therefore perceive the returns 
or losses according to the asset’s performance. Debt crowdfunding, peer-to-peer lending 
or crowdlending, all interchangeable terms, turns investors into lenders. Those interested 
in a venture thus provide debt financing to the organization in exchange for fixed 
payments over an established period of time.  
Crowdfunding is one of the main funding mechanisms for small businesses and 
organizations being promoted by the Jumpstart Our Businesses Act. The US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented Title II of the JOBS Act in September 
2013 and in so doing opened the door for online platforms to begin experimenting with 
equity crowdfunding. After the implementation of Title II, the public use of fundraising, 
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including equity crowdfunding, became legal for accredited investors. Title II was the 
first stage of how the JOBS Act transformed crowdfunding as it is known and executed 
today. Before, participation in equity crowdfunding was limited to accredited investors, 
defined as individuals whose net worth, excluding the value of their primary residence, is 
equal or greater to US$1 million, or whose annual salary is worth $200,000 or more. 
Given that relatively few Americans fall within the socioeconomic measure of accredited 
investors: only about 8 million American households are eligible to access equity 
crowdsourcing (Dorff, 2014).  
For these reasons, some non-accredited investor participation took place under Tittle 
II. Specifically, the Regulation A portion of the JOBS Act allows for non-accredited 
investor participation in projects under US$5 million. More importantly, the potential of 
non-accredited investor crowdfunding will be unleashed once Title III of the JOBS Act is 
implemented to its full effect and equity crowdfunding and crowdlending are legal across 
all of the US.  
In order to protect investors from fraudulent ventures and to regulate the 
crowdfunding market, the SEC will replace accreditation with a number of safeguards for 
investors under Title III of the JOBS Act (Dorff, 2014) (Barnett, 2015). The investment 
restrictions for non-accredited investors and other related rules include: 
• Regulations on non-accredited share of funding in an organization’s funding 
mechanisms.  
• Limits on individual’s investment based on income and net worth. 
o Individuals whose annual income is less than $100,000 may invest at most 
$2,000 or five percent (5%) of their annual income or net worth per year—
whichever is greater. 
o Individuals whose annual income is greater than $100,000 can invest up to 
10% of their annual income.  
• Investors must participate in crowdfunding through a broker or website.  
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• Significant disclosures are required from crowdfunding platforms to ensure  
transparency in market offerings.  
• Startups and small businesses can crowdfund up to $1,000,000 per year (Barnett, 
2015). 
Regulations require online services and brokers to establish a number of filters and 
provisions to potential projects and ventures. In fact, many of the issues stalling the 
enactment of Titles III and IV of the JOBS Act owed to issues of disclosure and 
transparency. Many of the regulations that the JOBS Act redefines are a legacy of the 
SEC’s creation following the  1920’s and 1930’s financial market collapse (Baneri, 
2015). Baneri (2015) explains how other authors have argued that disclosure is not the 
main issue threatening the inexperienced, non-accredited investor shopping for exciting 
enterprises. For these authors, investment opportunities reliant on equity crowdfunding 
are likely to have been unsuccessful in finding funding through conventional channels. 
Therefore, projects seeking crowdfunders are most likely to be poor investment 
opportunities given that other, arguably more experienced, investors have bypassed them 
first.  
These may be valid arguments against the quality of investment opportunities in 
the crowdfunding and crowdlending industry as a whole. At the same time, there is 
potential for crowdfunding and crowdlending as applied to the real estate industry to 
provide a different and unique perspective. Specifically, crowdfunding in real estate can 
serve as a tool for local investors to invest in local projects. Additionally, crowdfunding 
in real estate can offer financing to project typologies often excluded from traditional 
financing streams—such is the case of Maketto, a project introduced at the end of this 
chapter.  
WHAT IS NEXT? 
Despite the many concerns and criticism of policies initiated by the JOBS Act, 
crowdfunding, in its many forms, has grown to be an important sector in the financial 
investment industry. In recent years, crowdfunding has become a commonplace and 
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successful capital collection method for the arts and technology products. Digital 
technology, in the form of online crowdfunding platforms, plays a major role in the 
success of those seeking to reach out to the masses in hopes of funding their enterprises. 
Businesses and organizations are now able to bypass or complement typical funding 
sources, including banking, angel investors and venture capitalists, in order to maximize 
their funding sources. As regulations affecting crowdfunding equity and lending models 
increase the accessibility of these financing methods, we can expect the crowdfunding 
sector to strengthen its position in the investment industry as a whole.  
 The transition of equity and lending crowdfunding models into the real estate 
market has followed the footsteps of predecessors in the area, such as the arts and 
technology. One of the most notable early negotiations in the sector involved 85 
independent investors buying a 15% stake of the Hard Rock Café Palm Springs in July 
2014 for US$1.5 million (Grout, 2015)—evenly divided among almost $17,650 per 
investor. By that time, not long before the first SEC rulings on equity crowdfunding for 
accredited investors, the Wall Street Journal had reported crowdfunding to have raised 
US$135 million in debt and equity for owners and developers of real estate in the US 
(Simon and Brown, 2014).    
The growth of the crowdfunding sector as a real estate financial product has not 
slowed since the SEC’s first rulings on the JOBS Act. Massolution, a research, advisory 
and implementation firm specialized in crowdfunding, reports around US$1billion were 
raised during the 2013-2014 period (Grout, 2015). The same report estimated the growth 
to continue. Given these trends, the equity crowdfunding sector is expected to increase to 
around US$2.5 billion by the end of 2015 in the US alone. The projections in the 
Massolution 2015 Crowdfunding Industry Report predict that, by 2016, the crowdfunding 
sector, as a whole, will surpass the funding share of venture capital in the US (Barnett, 
2015).  
While Massolutions’ projections are optimistic and highlight the potential of the 
crowdfunding sector, that crowdfunding is their area of expertise and an invested interest 
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emphasizes that figures must not be interpreted as final without verification. In that sense, 
projections from the World Bank appear to support Massolutions’ projections on growth 
of the crowdfunding sector. The World Bank estimates the crowdfunding industry will 
contribute up to US$90 billion by 2020 to the global economy (Barnett, 2015). Other 
projections further support the expected growth of crowdfunding in the global economy. 
Infodev, the World Bank’s global innovation and entrepreneurship program, estimates 
crowdfunding’s share of the global economy to reach US$96 billion by 2025—almost 
double the share of global venture capital in 2014 (1.8 times to be more precise). While 
the figures include all four types of crowdfunding previously explained, they highlight 
the large-scale potential of small-scale investments. Beyond the United States, 
crowdsourcing has been successful in places like the Canada, United Kingdom, Italy, 
Sweden, Kenya, among many others. 
The numerous online platforms that support crowdfunding, in all varieties, forms, 
and purposes, also evidence the growth of the sector. The case of real estate equity 
crowdfunding is no different. About 85 well-established, active, online services for real 
estate crowdfunding exist in the US (Grout, 2015).  One can only expect the number to 
increase with the implementation of SEC rulings about non-accredited investors. Some of 
the best-known online services include: Fundrise LLC, Realty Mogul, Realty Shares, 
Crowd Streets, and Patch of Land. Fundrise alone boasts a 55,000+ network of members.  
Realty Mogul claims having raised more than US$80 million for financing 250+ 
properties. 
Each of the platforms performs their own evaluation and due-diligence of 
incoming projects according to internally-established processes and standards. On 
average, platforms report to offer publicly between 3% and 5% of the projects they 
evaluate. Platforms may choose to invest in the projects themselves, proving their trust in 
the investment’s potential—a practice for which Fundrise is notable. The next chapter 
will summarize the analysis of 167 projects from three different real estate crowdfunding 
platforms. 
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As of now, the performance of investments in the real estate equity crowdfunding 
market cannot be adequately evaluated. The real estate crowdfunding market has not 
been around for a long time, and returns are projected beyond its current age—most deals 
will expire in three to five years time. Even so, the scarce data available seems to support 
the argument for real estate crowdfunding as a relatively secure investment. Funding is 
relying, mostly, on debt products that are critical for real estate development. After all, 
debt is less risky, given that it is senior to equity payments. Seniority in real estate refers 
to the concept of Capital Stack and the order in which funding for a project is organized 
and the hierarchy of their payback. Massolution reports 75.7% of real estate 
crowdfunding as tied to debt, while 18.5% is equity-linked. Few projects are reported as 
problematic: only 2% of the 500 deals reported in 2014 by Massolution failed to achieve 
expected performance. 
Real estate crowdfunding’s incipient rise has attracted the attention of investors 
and developers alike, while not presenting overarching issues with existing investments. 
While only time will tell if this success holds, a number of factors may increase the 
interest and growth of the real estate sector—the first being the release of SEC rulings for 
non-accredited investors. Despite some allowances for non-accredited investors to 
participate prior to the Section III ruling, this participation was limited to projects under 
US$5 million by the JOBS Act. With rulings made public and put into place, the 
crowdfunding market will attract the attention of millions of Americans previously 
excluded from the equity crowdfunding market. Another factor is the application of SEC 
Regulation 5 by which foreign investors are allowed to participate in US-based 
investments—increasing potential investors to the market. The ultimate test of real estate 
equity’s crowdfunding success will be the performance of the first wave of investments. 
The argument for crowdfunding as an alternative financing system for ventures 
that fail to draw mainstream financial streams is mostly based on the assumption of a 
perfect market economy whereby information is perfect, transparent and democratic. In 
reality, the information of market economy is far from perfect, rendering the argument 
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about crowdfunding as an alternative to mainstream financial systems, as, at least 
partially, untrue. Mainstream financial sources and investors do not have access to all 
opportunities and ventures in the investment universe. They are also not absolutely 
knowledgeable about every industry. Even more importantly, even the savviest investors 
are not always right on their selection of assets. These conditions set up a counterpart to 
the vision presented by Baneri (2015) and, in fact, render crowdfunding as valuable and 
viable financial mechanism for unconventional projects and ventures.  
Just like real estate investment has proven to be a more secure asset in other 
publicly traded financial economics products, ventures in equity crowdfunding with real 
estate as the underlying asset may prove to be a less risky and more tangible investment 
for accredited and non-accredited investors alike. Real estate is typically less dependent 
and attached to the market forces affecting other asset products such as the stock market. 
Real estate investment is inherently spatial and, as such, requires knowledge about the 
dynamics of particular places. Investors can evaluate the future performance of stock 
assets without needing to deeply understand the physical setting upon where the assets 
are deployed. On the other hand, someone interested in a real estate development is most 
likely knowledgeable about the character and dynamics of the project context and why it 
will be successful, or not, under those conditions. In this sense, who is better equipped to 
promote real estate development relative to the demand, needs and conditions of a place 
than area residents? Real estate crowdfunding would allow for community members to 
support the kind of development they deem necessary and perceive as being successful in 
the future.  
Crowdfunding holds great potential for community interest and community 
demand-driven development not only because it relies in the collective knowledge of 
members but also because it challenges the regulatory framework and development goals 
of traditional real estate development practices. Traditional streams of financing for real 
estate are likely to be interested and, ultimately, favor larger projects with typical 
programs that are promoted by established real estate developers and organizations—
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those where profit is most certain. Many times, these projects are large in scale and 
disconnected from the social milieu in which they are set. Projects like these can happen 
at the expense of smaller scale and infill development; threatening the character and 
overseeing the needs of the community. Assuming that community members will favor 
small-scale infill development, real estate crowdfunding could facilitate the consolidation 
of the social and financial capital required to support the development of community-
driven and ad-hoc real estate. 
NOT-FOR-PROFITS, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
Not-for-profits have traditionally been involved in developing and executing 
important public and social services that fall beyond the government’s ability, reach and 
capacity. Theoretically, not-for-profits, through their work, earn their tax-exempt status 
because they perform a complimentary role to government social services and activities. 
The activities and projects not-for-profits engage in are beneficial to both government 
and society.   
Despite their important role in extending and sometimes even improving the work 
of public entities, not-for-profit organizations are more often than not associated with 
poor financial organization and performance. As a result, the benefits not-for-profits 
provide to communities, and society, as a whole, are not easily measured—especially not 
financially and, for this reason, are often not remunerable. Even more, not-for-profits’ 
financial sustenance is perceived by many to be secondary to their mission (Nichols and 
Trinh, 2010).  
Community development encompasses those activities and processes by which 
local communities and their members work together in order to raise their standard of 
living (UNESCO, 1956). Community development includes organizing and providing 
services including social welfare, health services, education, and economic development, 
among others.  The grassroots origin of community development focuses in the wellbeing 
of the community and directly relates to the work and mission of not-for-profits.  
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Nowadays, the development of affordable housing is commonly associated with 
not-for-profits but the reality is that affordable housing involves a broader spectrum of 
stakeholders and developers. The origins of community development are, in fact, tied to 
affordable housing too. The incentives and policies behind affordable housing, together 
with its social impact, have attracted not-for-profits since the late 1950’s and 1960’s. In 
fact, not-for-profit organizations are responsible for 15% of all affordable housing 
completed from 1960 to 1990 in the US (Brummel, 2009). Rachel Bratt (2007) estimates 
that of the 4.6 million units of subsidized housing units built up to 2007, close to one 
third of the total, about 1.5 million, can be attributed to not-for-profit developers and 
organizations. Because building housing alone did not accomplish the economic, social, 
environmental and cultural welfare goals to which not-for-profit organizations were 
committed, community development turned its attention to providing economic 
development and human services. The data also shows that not all-affordable housing, 
not even a majority can be attributed solely to not-for-profit organizations. Housing 
models such as the Alley Flat Initiative are an example of the promotion of alternative 
affordable housing types via ad-hoc community development.  
Today, community development by not-for-profits involves a wide variety of 
areas beyond housing. While the social impact of not-for-profits has increased over the 
years, preconceptions about their financial self-sustenance and dependency on short-term 
funding has not changed significantly. To remain operative, as a result, not-for-profits are 
mostly dependent on their own ability to attract funds in order to finance their operations. 
NOT-FOR-PROFITS AND CROWDFUNDING 
The financial constraints for funding by which not-for-profits are regulated limit 
their financial self-sufficiency and regeneration. In order to retain their taxation benefits, 
the inurement prohibition impedes not-for-profit institutions from issuing stock under 
their name (Nichols and Trinh, 2010). This prohibition is the primary distinction between 
not-for-profit and for-profit organizations. Under the prohibition, not-for-profits are 
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banned from distributing profits from their operation among those who control the 
organization.  
On the other hand, not-for-profits can, according to IRS rulings, create earned 
income activities (as long as they are related to their mission) and create strategic 
alliances with for-profit organizations. Successful not-for-profit organizations do take full 
advantage of these provisions: 75% of not-for-profits involved in community 
development expect to increase their self-generated income by 25%, and 73% of not-for-
profits report having strategic allegiances with for-profit partners—63% of which were 
initiated by the not-for-profit counterpart (Nichols and Trinh, 2010). Many not-for-profit 
organizations have turned to donation and reward-based crowdfunding sites in order to 
raise funds and promote their work.  
The financial self-sufficiency and regeneration of not-for-profits involved in 
community development, then, depends in great part on the creative and proactive 
diligence to craft funding mechanisms that comply with IRS regulations and guarantee, 
even further, the social impact of the organization. Equity crowdfunding does not appear 
to be a viable financing alternative for not-for-profits alone to pursue. Specifically, they 
are limited by the previously explained inurement prohibition ruling over their tax-
exempt provisions. However, with the recent tendency for not-for-profit and for-profit to 
create partnerships, instruments could be crafted for enabling the use of equity 
crowdfunding in real state projects for community development.  
On one hand, donation or reward-based crowdfunding represent a familiar 
funding mechanism for not-for-profits, only in a new, digital, global and interconnected 
environment. Crowdfunding must be considered a tool for gathering both financial and 
social capital in large-scale and broad-reaching markets. The interaction of donors via 
social media and crowdfunding platforms can provide more than just financial funding to 
institutions (Davies, 2015). Not-for-profit organizations involved in crowdfunding can 
harness the interaction between individuals in order to foster volunteering and 
participation beyond digital contributions and into concrete participation. Research shows 
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that crowdfunding’s donor interaction and exchange potential has yet to be exploited to 
its full capacity (Davies, 2015).  
Besides its promise to draw individuals with shared interests together, 
crowdfunding must not be overseen or disregarded as a financing mechanism of great 
potential for not-for-profit organizations. In Chapters 3 and 4, we evaluate the feasibility 
of peer-to-peer crowdfunding to be the main financing source for the completion of an 
Alley Flat project in Austin, TX.  
THE ALLEY FLAT INITIATIVE 
Alley Flats is a term used to describe a specific type of auxiliary dwelling unit 
(ADU) in Austin, TX. Alley Flats are relatively affordable rental auxiliary dwelling units. 
For the purposes of this research, ADUs are understood as a form of small and self-
contained urban infill housing that shares a site with but works independently from a 
larger single-family unit. In Austin, Alley Flats are limited to 1,100 square feet in area. 
Established in the early 2000s, the Alley Flat Initiative is a collaboration between The 
University of Texas at Austin Center for Sustainable Development (CSD) with two local 
not-for-profit organizations: Guadalupe Neighborhood Development Corporation 
(GNDC) and the Austin Community Design and Development Center (ACDDC). The 
goal of the initiative is to create a flexible and self-perpetuating delivery system for 
sustainable and affordable housing in Austin, in the form of ADUs. The ADU units, also 
known as Alley Flats, are affordable rental units as determined by City of Austin 
S.M.A.R.T Housing policy.  
The not-for-profit organizations involved provide support to homeowners seeking 
to develop an Alley Flat on their properties. The property owner must finance the 
development of the unit, although GNDC has developed some Alley Flats as part of their 
institutional work. In this form of ad-hoc real estate development, the owner agrees to 
preserve the unit’s affordability for at least five years in exchange for reduced 
professional design fees, provided by ACDDC, and for express permitting and fee 
exemptions. While ACDDC does not directly promote the development of the Alley 
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Flats, their relationship with property owners and their interest in increasing affordable 
infill urban housing constitutes an instance of strategic for-profit and not-for profit 
allegiance. On one hand, the property owner benefits from the unit’s rental income, 
while, on the other, the not-for-profit’s mission of building affordable housing is 
accomplished with the completion of the new unit.  
Alley Flats are not easy to finance. Most times, property owners do not have 
enough equity on their property or equity saved in order to afford typical down payments 
for financial products. Even if they did, when property owners are evaluated for 
qualification—through acceptable debt-to-income ratios and other considerations by 
financial institutions—the existing lending structure omits potential ADU rental income 
from their considerations (Brown and Taylor, 2012). The following chapters evaluate the 
potential of crowdfunding as an alternative for a building typology that often fails to 
qualify for traditional financing. The Alley Flat initiative constitutes the integration of 
non-for-profit organization and private owner interests—real estate crowdfunding can 
therefore become a tool for cooperative outreach and funding between both stakeholders. 
PEOPLE VOTE WITH THEIR CLICKS: THE CASE FOR REAL ESTATE CROWDFUNDING AS A 
DRIVER OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
In general, crowdfunding is best known and recognized as a funding alternative 
for initiatives related to the arts and technology. Equity and peer-to-peer lending 
crowdfunding are parallel and democratizing products that counter venture capital and 
angel investors. Both of these crowdfunding types run the risk of being conceived by the 
general public as the opportunity of a lifetime for investing in the one product that will 
see an investment multiplied by the thousands in returns. These perceptions are limited 
and misleading. Hopefully, SEC rulings on non-accredited crowdfunding investment will 
address such attitudes and false advertisement. Financial economics aside, the shared 
economy of crowdfunding has created an alternative route to development and creation: 
be it in the form of a film project, a journalist covering alternative news stories, a 
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democratic way for readers to pick and fund the stories they want to read, or grassroots 
initiatives to gather widespread, even viral, support (Bennet, Chin, Jones, 2014). 
A known idiom referring to population mobility as a guide to understanding the 
preferred general preference of political governance structures dictates that people “vote 
with their feet”. Once online interaction and social media is considered, supply and 
demand has entered a new age of being concerned with community development. The 
digital space, in this case, in the form of real estate crowdfunding offers an opportunity 
for people to “vote with their clicks”. The will of the crowdfunding pack will therefore 
determine the kinds of projects and services deemed to be necessary and valued by the 
local community. Uncommon project typologies with limited access to traditional 
funding due to the structure of finance qualification may find an alternative in real estate 
crowdfunding. 
Given the uncertainty around the long-term success of any type of crowdfunding 
investment product for becoming the preferred financial product of the middle-class 
investor, real estate crowdfunding must be evaluated from a different lens. Real estate 
crowdfunding could change the development trends of a community. The will and joint 
resolution of many, the crowd, now in the form of financial capital, can fund the 
development of projects that best benefit the needs of the community. On reflecting about 
a conversation with Fundrise founders, brothers Ben and Dan Miller, Matt Yglesias 
writes: “a huge network of small-time, commercial real-estate shareholders could provide 
a much-needed counterweight to the plague of NIMBYs (Not in my backyarders) 
strangling America’s cities” (Yglesias, 2013).  
If real estate crowdfunding can really change what is built in American cities, it 
can also fund those social services and grassroots initiatives that local community and 
shared economy deem necessary. Local not-for-profits and community development 
organizations, as well as those leading grassroots initiatives in communities, can find 
financial and social support in crowdfunding. The activist architects and urbanists, the 
maverick politicians, and all the alternative communities (McGuirk, 2014) will find, at 
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the very least, the financial tools to support the beginning stages of their projects and use 
the social momentum of crowdfunding to trigger financial and political support systems. 
Almost 20 years ago, in the midst of New York State lowering funding to social 
programs in the state, Ronely Daniels, then Vice-president of Economic Revitalization at 
Empire State Development Corportation, said to those gathered in a community meeting: 
“I believe that people should be stakeholders in their communities”—“they should have 
equity in their communities and they need to elevate their thinking beyond the notion of 
the non-profit enterprise and embrace the notion of profit”. He added to his remarks a 
commentary about the kinds of projects in which the community should be involved and 
those that would contribute to economic development of the community: “projects that 
are sustainable, that generate revenue” (Bailloy, 1996). With the introduction of 
crowdfunding into community development real estate projects, members of the 
community can own a small share of their neighborhood—a share on the spaces that 
matter the most to them and that generate value to their community and city. 
Real estate crowdfunding has proven effective in specific projects. For example, 
in a local initiative led by Fundrise founders in Washington, a retail project named 
Maketto was completed in 2015 and funded by community stakeholders via 
crowdfunding. Maketto and another project associated to social equity real estate 
development in crowdfunding will be discussed through the chapters that follow. The 
question is whether or not real estate crowdfunding can become a large-scale applicable 
funding mechanism that disrupts market-driven development trends.  
Many equity and peer-to-peer lending crowdfunding platforms that cater to 
individuals and organizations with inherently environmental or social missions exist: 
some of them include CauseVox, Amado, Kiva, iOby or Spacehive for reference. These 
sites are unique in the crowdfunding platform market—they cater those seeking to invest 
in projects for “social good” but none are exclusively geared towards real estate assets. 
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Real estate crowdfunding platforms are, to the extents of the research at hand, limited in 
observing the social and environmental impact of real estate development. In the future, 
crowdfunding, and its application in real estate and community development must not be 
disregarded as a tool for financing community led initiatives and projects that aim to 
benefit and improve the standard of living in our neighborhoods and community, such as 
the Alley Flat Initiative. 
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CHAPTER 2: REAL ESTATE CROWDFUNDING PLATFORMS: 
ANALYSIS OF THREE PLATFORMS AND THEIR FEATURED 
INVESTMENT PRODUCTS 
GENERAL LANDSCAPE 
Since its adoption in 2012, the JOBS Act and its open policy on crowdfunding 
have stimulated the development of online crowdfunding platforms in the United States. 
The impending SEC rulings that permit non-accredited investors to participate in the 
crowdfunding industry will increase the magnitude of the industry but will probably also 
motivate an increase in the number of crowdfunding platforms already available.  
The real estate crowdfunding industry did not develop until years after the first 
crowdfunding platforms, which were mostly dedicated to donation and reward-based 
crowdfunding but set the groundwork for new forms to be developed. As previously 
explained in the literature review, changes in policy and technology have also contributed 
to an increased participation and presence of crowdfunding investment products online. 
The landscape of online real estate crowdfunding platforms in the U.S. is diverse and in 
constant change.  
According to the list of crowdfunding platforms published by Time Realty News, 
156 real estate crowdfunding platforms are online and operating. Of those 156, only three 
operate in Canada, the rest in the United States. Time Realty News relies on their own 
expertise in the field and on crowdsourcing in order to maintain their list up-to-date. The 
number of platforms now operating in the US reveals the growing interest in the real 
estate crowdfunding industry by the securities investment industry. Recently, in 2011, the 
Miller brothers began working within pre-JOBS Act regulations to complete their first 
crowdfunded project and later, in 2012, founded Fundrise, the first real estate 
crowdfunding platform. In only three years since the first real estate crowdfunding site 
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was unveiled and two years since the passing of the JOBS Act, more than 150 real estate 
crowdfunding online platforms are in operation. But real estate crowdfunding is not 
limited to North America: platforms in Europe, South America, Asia, Middle East, Africa 
and Australia all operate within their own local regulations and even some platforms 
offer international real estate investment opportunities. 
The increasing number of platforms available in the United States corresponds to 
a general perception of future growth and opportunity in the crowdfunding industry, 
especially as relates to the real estate investment industry, which has been historically 
reserved to a niche sector of investors. Determining the extent to which the 150+ real 
estate crowdfunding platforms are financially successful is beyond the scope of this study 
and, even if it were, the short term existence of these platforms do not permit significant 
assessment at this time. Stakeholders in the industry have just begun to consider how to 
evaluate the performance of the real estate crowdfunding industry amid existing 
limitations. 
Lend It USA, the organization behind the world’s largest and most important 
conference series dedicated to connecting the global online lending community. Recently, 
Lend It USA published, through its Lend Academy portal, a list of the nine leading real 
estate crowdfunding platforms based on originations (Lichtenwald, 2015). Participating 
companies were required to submit at least one of the following: total originations, 
originations over the three months preceeding August 31st 2015, or total monthly 
originations for the month of August 2015. The researchers used the data to rank the 
organizations according to their total originations and normalized monthly originations. 
Lend It is limited because it does not acknowledge the number of platforms contacted, 
their methodology or the fact that companies are generally protective about their internal 
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financial data. Lend It’s ranking is useful, however, for understanding the magnitude of 
operations of some of the leading firms in the real estate crowdfunding sector. 
The total originations according to Lend It USA rankings vary from $10.3 million 
to $144 million. The normalized monthly originations range from an estimated $25 
million for the platform occupying the first place in the ranking, Lending Home, to $5 
million estimated monthly originations for AssetAvenue, the 9th ranked real estate 
crowdfunding platform. However, total originations are a misleading measure to evaluate 
the potential of the real estate crowdfunding industry. First, specifically to this study, not 
all companies reported their total originations. Second, platforms surveyed had been 
operating for three years or less with a large majority of their investment products still 
expected to be repaid by borrowers. Their performance therefore remains unknown. The 
findings of Lend It’s ranking initiative must be continued in the future in order to 
accurately reflect the expected growth of the industry and the performance of associated 
investment products.   
Despite the incipience of the real estate crowdfunding sector, experts and those 
involved in the industry are optimistic about its future, especially when speaking about 
the inclusion of non-accredited investors into the market.  Bruce Lipnick, the founder and 
CEO of Crowd Alliance, an equity crowdfunding platform expanding its services to real 
estate crowdfunding, elaborates on the potential unleashed by the JOBS Act and the 
expansion of the market (Drake, 2015): 
“In 2013, there were 8.6 million accredited investors, including angels that 
invested a total of $24.8 billion. In 2012, a mere 4 percent of that number, 265,000 
business angels, invested $22.5 billion. I see this freedom to advertise private offerings 
under the Reg D 506c Act, passed 23 September 2013, as the future of opportunities.” 
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Lipnick refers to the opportunities for platforms once the market opens entirely to 
non-accredited investors. At the time this research was performed, regulations for non-
accredited investors were still not in place. Further research on a more open and 
transparent set of platforms, guided by Section III regulations, can provide added insight 
into potential structure and products across different platforms.  
PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVES 
This section is concerned with the research and survey of three leading real estate 
crowdfunding platforms in the United States. The purpose of the section is to better 
understand the business models of organizations and investment opportunities available 
through their real estate crowdfunding platforms. The findings of the section will provide 
guidance for the modeling of a real estate crowdfunding scenario for an Alley Flat 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4.  
METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
The selection of the crowdfunding platforms evaluated in this section of the 
research was initially guided by: 
• Literature review and related research on the topic of real estate crowdfunding: 
real estate crowdfunding platforms that were often mentioned and referenced by 
previous research and media outlets.  
• Online rankings and news stories highlighting currently outstanding and top-
performing real estate crowdfunding platforms. 
Data for each platforms was gathered from their portals and complemented with 
parallel literature to create a platform profile, which includes type of crowdfunding 
model (type or types of investment models), year of founding, physical location, states 
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where opportunities are offered, and number of employees, among other relevant 
available data. 
The projects in the sample include all projects available for review upon 
registration to the crowdfunding platforms. Limitations in the sample are described in 
more detail below. Data collected for the study of investment opportunities includes: 
project location (city and state), building use or program, current annual return (when 
available), expected gross annual return, investment size or crowdfunding goal, minimum 
investment per investor, term of agreement, and investment type. 
The initial purpose of the research—to focus on the major and most relevant 
crowdfunding platforms—was limited by the regulations ruling over equity 
crowdfunding and, by extension, over all real estate crowdfunding platforms. Since, at 
the time of research, the standing SEC rulings only allow for accredited investors to 
participate in the equity crowdfunding sector, an overwhelming majority of real estate 
crowdfunding platforms identified for this study require user registration and 
accreditation background checks in order for users to access existing and completed 
investment products. 
From the twenty platforms identified as potential sites for research, only three 
permitted open access to their existing and completed investment products upon 
registration. Even those, “open” platforms do not display their complete list of investment 
opportunities to users that have not completed the accredited investor checks. The 
findings of this study are therefore limited to the analysis of the data gathered from those 
investment opportunities listed to all users, without distinction of investment 
accreditation status. The three real estate crowdfunding platforms investigated in this 
section are: Fundrise, Patch of Land and Groundfloor.   
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The period of analysis is another major limitation of this analysis. Real estate 
crowdfunding platforms and the investment opportunities they offer are in constant 
change. The data collection for this analysis was carried out between September 27th, 
2015 and October 13th 2015. The data collected includes both,active and fully funded 
deals in order to achieve a representative sample of the available opportunities at the 
time. All the products accounted for in the analysis were available for review by all 




This section provides a detailed description of the findings from the analysis 
performed on the real estate investment products of the three platforms explored in this 
study. A summary of the findings is available in Table 2.1 (Summary of findings from 
crowdfunding platform analysis). The table is located in the end of this chapter.  
FUNDRISE 
Platform Profile 
Fundrise was founded with the goal to “give everyone the opportunity to invest in 
real estate” (Fundrise, 2015). Furthermore, the company’s vision is that everyone should 
be able to invest in the places around them - a vision directly related to one of the most 
promising characteristics of real estate crowdfunding: local knowledge and interest.  
Brothers Daniel and Ben Miller are the founders of Fundrise.  Sons of a 
prominent real estate developer in Washington D.C., they are pioneers in the equity real 
estate crowdfunding industry. As early as 2012, the Millers worked with the SEC in order 
to allow for crowd-financing of Maketto, a renewal of a mixed-use retail project in DC 
involving $325,000 in equity collected from 175 individual investors. Following their 
success with Maketto, the Miller brothers founded Fundrise in 2012.  
Fundrise’s headquarters are located in Washington D.C. According to their 
website, their office is operated by 26 employees.  Fundrise discloses a list of their 
investors and board of directors. Their business model revolves around displaying the 
prominence of their investors and developers in order to project a sense of stability and 
acquired knowledge to prospective investors.  
Furthermore, Fundrise claims to underwrite and prefund the projects they “put 
out” to the public in order to demonstrate their commitment and trust in the projects they 
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have reviewed and promote. In fact, Fundrise claims their due diligence process results in 
fewer than 1% of the projects reviewed to be approved and supported by the platform 
(Fundrise, 2015). Their pursuit to gather a reputable set of investors and developers and 
to be portrayed as a knowledgeable and secure intermediary has positioned them at the 
forefront of the industry. Investors and developers in their portfolio include: Silverstein 
Properties, Ren Ren Inc., Berman Enterprises, Collaborative Fund, Guggenheim Partners, 
among many other major organizations. At the time of this research, Fundrise claimed to 
have over 69,000 online members and that 920 companies and developers use their 
services.   
Investment Opportunities 
Fundrise allowed for the review of forty-four (44) projects before undergoing 
accredited investor background checks. The findings from the screening of these 
investment opportunities follow: 
Location: 
• Over 30% of the investment opportunities, 13 out of the 44 surveyed projects, 
were located in the Washington, DC area. 
• 25% of the investment opportunities, 11 out of the 44 surveyed projects, were 
located in the state of New York, and most projects are specifically located in 
Brooklyn and Manhattan.  
• The state of Washington had 4 active projects in the platform, followed by 
Pennsylvania with 3 projects, and North Carolina with 2 investment opportunities.  
• States with one investment opportunity include: Minnesota, Virginia, Oregon, 
Colorado, Florida, Texas, Indiana, Georgia, Arizona, Utah and California.  
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Building Use: 
• 19 of the 44 building uses of the projects displayed in the platform were listed as 
Multifamily Housing.   
• 25% (11 projects) of the available investment opportunities were listed under 
Mixed Use building use, which in most cases involved some type of multifamily 
housing.  
• 6 projects were listed as Single Family Residential and 4 projects as retail.  
• Other uses with only one project include: Office, Shared Manufacturing, Mixed 
Use Manufacturing and Land. 
• Land is listed as a Use Type and refers to an investment opportunity involving the 
acquisition of land with an undefined building use.  
Gross Annual ROI (Return On Investment): 
• Fundrise claims to offer investors an average annual ROI of between 12 and 16%. 
• The mean annual ROI of the 44 projects surveyed was 12%.  The minimum 
annual ROI offered was 7% and the maximum was 23.5%.   
• The first quartile of the annual ROI data was 11.3%. The third quartile of the 
sample was 15.85%. 
• The average annual ROI offered on Fundrise according to the 44 sampled 
investment opportunities is 13.3%.  
Underlying Security: 
• The majority of investment opportunities are equity investments: 60% or 26 of the 
44 sampled investment opportunities were listed as an equity investment.  
• The remaining 18 projects surveyed were debt investment opportunities: either 
senior or mezzanine debt deals.  
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Crowdfunding Goal: 
• The median crowdfunding goal from Fundrise projects was $500,000.  The 
minimum project investment size or crowdfunding goal was $150,000 and the 
largest project crowdfunding goal in the platform at the time was $3,100,000.  
• The project crowdfunding goal data revealed a first quartile of $321,250 while the 
investment size third quartile was $1,258,750. 
• The average project investment size on Fundrise according to the 44 sampled 
investment opportunities is $835,114. 
Minimum Investment:  
• 84% of the investment opportunities reviewed required investors to participate 
with a minimum investment of $5,000.  
• Other projects required investors to participate with investments of as little as 
$100 or as much as $10,000. 
Investment Term: 
• The median investment term for the investment opportunities reviewed was 24 
months.  
• The shortest investment duration found was 9 months; the longest investment 
term was 60 months.  
• Pure equity deals do not have an investment period as they involve the investor 
acquiring an indefinite equity stake of the project in case. 
Project Objectives: 
• The definition of the different project objectives of each investment opportunity 
varied to a relevant degree. However, some trends are apparent from inspection of 
the data.  
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• Renovations, including historic renovations and adaptive reuse projects, account 
for 17 of the 44 investment opportunities.  
• Ground-up construction investment opportunities account for 8 of the 44 projects 
reviewed.  
• Property Repositioning and Stabilization investment opportunities are another 
major sector, representing 11 of the 44 offerings on Fundrise. 
• Pre-development and acquisition related investment opportunities are less 
prevalent in the data set but are worth mentioning.  




PATCH OF LAND 
Platform Profile 
Patch of Land’s mission is to “solve the problem of slow, inefficient, fragmented 
and obscure private real estate lending by using the latest technology, data and process 
efficiency to more accurately assign risk profiles and project viability, while greatly 
reducing time and cost of loan underwriting for borrowers with real estate projects that 
are overlooked or rejected by banks and traditional lenders” (Patch of Land, 2015). The 
organization's mantra is “building wealth, growing communities”. Different from 
Fundrise, Patch of Land is, apparently, not solely concerned with building a reputation of 
stability and confidence through the reputation of their investor and client network. They 
aim to provide funding for projects that are otherwise overlooked by traditional funding 
mechanism. As a result, investment opportunities in Patch of Land are typically not 
investment products offered by large, corporate real estate development firms, but fairly 
local and ad-hoc real estate development projects.  
Patch of Land (PoL) mitigates the risk associated with smaller developers and 
grassroots borrowers through its business model. PoL does not offer equity investment 
opportunities. PoL is a crowdfunding real estate platform that offers various secured real 
estate debt products on assets backed by first position liens and personal guarantees—
meaning the creditor, PoL, has the legal right to sell the collateral, the property, and meet 
obligations with investors upon debtor failing to meet the loan obligations. In essence, 
PoL is an online peer-to-peer real estate (P2RE) debt or crowdlending marketplace.   
PoL was founded soon after the passing of the JOBS Act in 2012. In fact, one of 
its founders, Jason Fritton, was directly involved in lobbying for the promotion of the 
JOBS Act (Patch of Land, 2015). PoL began as a collaboration between Jason, who was 
an experienced e-commerce entrepreneur; his brother, Brian, who brought his software 
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engineering and systems architecture knowledge; Carlo Tabibi, an experienced Los 
Angeles technology and real estate entrepreneur who provided financial advice; and 
AdaPia d’Errico, who was responsible for the branding and marketing strategies. In 
addition to the founders of PoL, 19 other employees are currently responsible for the 
organization’s operations.   
With headquarters based in Los Angeles, California, and a satellite office in 
Brooklyn, New York, PoL investment opportunities display a wide range of geographic 
location. Borrowers of over 20 states in the US have successfully funded their projects 
via PoL. As of November 28th, 2015, and since late 2013 when operations resumed, PoL 
funded 178 loans for a gross value of $66,871,800. Debt investment products have started 
to pay back funders: $13,367,960 has been returned to investors as of 2015 (Patch of 
Land, 2015).   
Most investment opportunities in PoL are renovation and repair related loans. PoL 
estimates the average Loan to ARV (after-repair-value) of funded loans to be 37.38%. 
The average rate of return on funded projects is 11.84% and the average loan size of 
projects to the date of inquiry is $375,173 (Patch of Land, 2015). According to reports 
from the investment platform, at least 93% of their loans are dedicated to housing 
projects: 57% of all projects funded being single-family residential projects and 36% of 
all projects multi-family residential. 
Investment Opportunities 
At the time of research, Fundrise allowed for the review of seventy-six (76) open 
for investment and funded projects before requiring an accredited investor background 
check. The findings from the screening of these investment opportunities follow: 
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Location: 
• Investment opportunities featured at the time of research were available in 15 
states of the US.  
• 39.5% of the investment opportunities were concentrated in the state of New 
Jersey. Other states with high relevant concentration of loan deals include 
California, with 14.5% of total investment opportunities within its state 
boundaries, New York, with 10.5%, and Colorado, with 7.9%.  
• Other states with PoL loans include: Vermont, Michigan, North Carolina, Florida, 
Tennessee, Texas, Maryland, Illinois, Louisiana, Washington DC (District of 
Columbia) and Iowa.  
Building Use: 
• Consistent with the platform’s reports, 58% of the reviewed investment 
opportunities were related to single-family residential projects, the rest of the 
investment opportunities corresponded to multifamily residential projects.  
• All investment opportunities in the sample correspond to residential projects, no 
other use, such as commercial or mixed-use, was reported.  
Gross Annual ROI (return on investment): 
• PoL claims to offer investors average annual ROI (return on investment) of 
11.84%. 
• ROI rates on PoL’s featured investment opportunities only ranged between 10% 
and 13% and they were fixed to 1% rate changes limited to that range. 
Underlying Security: 
• All investment products offered by PoL are peer-to-peer real estate lending 
products. No equity crowdfunding products are offered in this platform.  
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Crowdfunding Goal: 
• The median crowdfunding goal from PoL projects was $215,000. The smallest 
project crowdfunding goal was $58,000 and the largest project crowdfunding goal 
in the platform at the time was $1,950,000.  
• The project crowdfunding goal data revealed a first quartile of $167,000 while the 
investment size third quartile was $440,000. 
• The average project investment size on PoL according to the 77 reviewed 
investment opportunities is $405,929. 
Minimum Investment:  
• Only 11 of the 77 reviewed investment opportunities required a minimum 
investment for participation.  Whenever they did require a minimum participation, 
projects required a minimum investment of $5,000. 
Investment Term: 
• Investment terms in PoL ranged from 6 to 18 months in duration.  
• A vast majority of investment opportunities required a 12-month investment 
length.   
• Only 5 projects out of 77 total projects required an 18-month investment 
commitment. Another 7 projects required shorter-term, 6-month, investment 
commitments.   
Project Objectives: 
• Considering all investment opportunities were related to residential properties 6 
project objectives are found: Acquisition Only; Acquisition and Renovation; 
Renovation Only; Renovation and Refinance; Refinance and Acquisition; 
Refinance Only. 
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• Renovation and Refinance includes projects consisting on financing renovations 
by using PoL loans. Once renovations are completed, properties are refinanced 
vie traditional funding mechanisms.  
• More than half of the reviewed investment opportunities, 53.2%, were 
Acquisition and Renovation deals. 20.8% of the deals involve projects dealing 
with in property Acquisition Only.  
• Renovation and Refinance projects represent 13% of the reviewed investment 
opportunities, while Refinance Only deals represent 7.8%.  
• Renovation only and Acquisition and Refinance investment opportunities are less 
prevalent project objectives in this sample. 





Groundfloor’s mission is to “reformat and open private capital markets for the 
benefit of individual investors and the investments they fund” (Groundfloor, 2015). 
Similar to PoL, Groundfloor focuses on real estate transactions in the form of peer-to-
peer lending through crowdfunding. By August 31st, 2015, before the passing of Title III 
of the JOBS Act, Groundfloor claimed to be the first and only online real estate 
marketplace open to non-accredited investors nation-wide, as approved by the SEC. Their 
status as a non-accredited investor marketplace allowed for analysis of their existing 
investment opportunities because all their investment products were available for 
inspection without accredited investor background checks.  
Brian Dally and Nick Bhargava founded Groundfloor on February 2013 
(Groundfloor, 2015). The organization is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.  The 
organization is composed of 10 employees, including its two founders. Similar to 
Fundrise, Groundfloor is diligent about highlighting the expertise of their board of 
directors and group of advisors in order to portray a sense of collective experience and 
knowledge on the real estate industry. 
At the time of this study, Groundfloor had successfully funded or had available 
investment opportunities in nine states of the United States: Massachusetts, Maryland, 
Washington DC (District of Columbia), Virginia, Georgia, Illinois, Washington and 
California. Investors were offered an average 12% ROI on investment products put 
through the platform in 6 to 12 month investment length periods.  
 46 
Investment Opportunities 
At the time of research, Groundfloor allowed for the review of forty-seven (47) 
crowdfunding investment products including products open for investment and funded 
projects. Following their early approval as a non-accredited investor crowdfunding 
platform, Groundfloor expected their availability of investment opportunities to increase 
drastically in the near future. The findings from the screening of these investment 
opportunities follow: 
Location: 
• Investment opportunities featured at the time of research were available in only 
four states in the United States, as compared to their historical geographical 
distribution of funded loans, which expands to nine states.  
• An overwhelming majority of featured investment opportunities were located in 
the state of Georgia: 43 of the 47 projects, in other words, more than 90% of the 
investment opportunities.  
• Colorado, New Jersey and Washington DC (District of Columbia) were the other 
three states with available investment opportunities at the time  
Building Use: 
• Only 10.4% of the featured investment products corresponded to Multifamily 
Residential-related projects.   
• The remaining 89.6% of crowdfunded loans in the platforms relate to Single 
Family Residential projects. No other building uses were found in the sample at 
the time of research.  
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Gross Annual ROI (return on investment): 
• Groundfloor claims to offer investors average annual ROI (return on investment) 
of 12%. 
• ROI rates on Groundfloor’s featured investment opportunities ranged between 8% 
and 25.8%.  
• The mean ROI rate in the sample was 13%, while the sample’s first quartile was 
9.6% and the third quartile 16%. 
• The average ROI rate in Grounfloor’s featured investment opportunities was 
12.97%, almost 1% higher than what the organization claims the platform’s 
average ROI rate to be. However, the sample evaluated is limited to only 47 
projects and does not include all crowdfunded loans.   
Underlying Security: 
• All investment opportunities offered by Groundfloor were peer-to-peer real estate 
lending investment products. No equity crowdfunding products are offered in this 
platform.  
• Groundfloor discloses the underlying security on the investment product. Loans 
are either first or second lien in their investment structure.  
• Three quarters of the evaluated loan investment opportunities in the platform had 
a first lien loan structure.  
Crowdfunding Goal: 
• The median crowdfunding goal from Groundfloor projects was $52,500. The 
minimum project investment size or crowdfunding goal was $8,000 and the 
largest project crowdfunding goal in the platform at the time was $284,000. 
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• The project crowdfunding goal data revealed a first quartile of $38,750 while the 
investment size third quartile was $88,000. 
• According to the 47 reviewed investment opportunities, the average loan 
investment size found in Groundfloor was $161,933. 
Minimum Investment:  
• No minimum investment requirements are disclosed in any of the project 
descriptions in this platform.  
Investment Term: 
• Groundfloor’s featured loan investment opportunities were structured in 6, 9 or 12 
month long investment length periods.  
• Most loans were found to be structured under 6 and 12-month investment periods, 
the majority under a 12-month commitment.  
Project Objectives: 
• Considering all investment opportunities were related to residential properties 
four main project objectives include: Acquisition Only; Acquisition and 
Renovation; Renovation Only; New Construction.  
• Almost half of loan project objectives, 48.9%, were related to renovation only 
projects. Acquisition and Renovation projects represent 17% of the featured 
investment opportunities. Projects related to property renovations represent a 
majority of the loan project objectives in the analysis of featured loans in 
Groundfloor’s platform.  
• New construction projects are another relevant project objective type 
corresponding to 23.4% of the share of project objectives.   
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ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
16 DC DC Multifamily 43% 7.0% 13.3% Equity 60% $150,000 $835,114 r $100 9 - 60 mo 24 mo Renovation, Hist. Renovation, Adaptive Reuse 39%
NY Mixed Use 25% 11.3% Debt 40% $321,250 $5,000 Property Reposition, Stabilization 25%
WA Single Family 14% 12.0% $500,000 $10,000 Ground-up Construction 18%
Retail 5% 15.8% $1,258,750 Predevelopment, Acquisition 18%
Others 13% 23.5% $3,100,000
15 NJ CA Single Family 58% 10.0% 11.8% Debt 100% $58,000 $405,929 o $5,000 6 - 18 mo 12 mo Acquisition & Renovation 53%
CA NY Multifamily 42% - $167,000 Acqusition 21%
NY - $215,000 Renovation & Refinance 13%
- $440,000 Refinance 8%
13.0% $1,950,000 Renovation, Acquisition & Refinance 5%
4 GA GA Single Family 90% 6.0% 12.9% Debt (first lien) 75% $8,000 $161,935 nr - 6, 9, 10 mo 12 mo Renovation 49%
CO Multifamily 10% 9.6% Debt (second lien) 25% $38,750 New Construction 23%
NJ 13.0% $52,500 Acquisition & Renovation 17%
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Table 2.1: Summary of findings from crowdfunding platform analysis. In the table, ROI=Return On Investment, fq=first 
quintile, med=median, tq=third quintile. 
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Projects Featured Are Close To Platforms 
One of the main assumptions distinguishing crowdfunding campaigns that finance 
real estate products from those related to other product types is the crucial role of local 
knowledge and experience.  In the case of real estate crowdfunding campaigns,  
promoters and investors must be closely related to the physical context of the project.  
Because real estate is a physical, generally permanent and stationary asset, its financial 
success depends as much on its appropriate management as on the real estate market 
affecting the property.   
The results of the survey generally confirm the study’s initial assumption.  The 
platforms in this study diligently display the diversity of locations in which projects have 
been historically funded.  However, according to the sample analyzed, project location 
and distribution are significantly related to the location of the platform’s headquarters or 
offices.  More projects are located in the states where platforms operate.  In the case of 
the three platforms analyzed, the state with most investment opportunities available at the 
time of research corresponds to states where headquarters are located.  In the case of 
Patch Of Land, New Jersey is the state with most projects featured in the platform.  Patch 
of Land offices are located in California and New York (satellite office).  The magnitude 
of projects located in New Jersey is attributable to the fact that PoL operates in New York 
and has direct access to knowledge and developers in both New York and New Jersey.  
Despite the tendency of investment opportunities featured in a particular real 
estate crowdfunding platform to be located close to the platform’s operational location, 
investment platforms are actively offering investment opportunities in states where they 
do not operate directly.  Investment opportunities and the diversity of location will 
depend on the platform’s particular business model, due diligence methods and their 
degree of exposure with promoters in other states.  In the sample studied, Fundrise and 
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Patch of Land offered investment opportunities in 16 and 15 states respectively, including 
their home-base state.   
The findings of this analysis partially confirm the relationship of local knowledge 
and experience with real estate development in the context of real estate crowdfunding 
platforms.  A platform is more likely to offer a majority of investment opportunities 
related to projects in relative proximity to their area of operation.  Further research should 
analyze a larger sample of active and funded projects in order to ratify these findings.  
The relationship of funders, their location and their proximity to the projects they choose 
to invest in merits future research.  However, data specific to funders is only available to 
platforms and the location of investors in relationship to the location of projects they 
decide to fund cannot be established.   
The Crowd Funds Residential Development 
Housing is the main building use of investment opportunities in the three 
platforms studied.  Multifamily and mixed-use developments were more prevalent than 
single-family projects in Fundrise investment opportunities.  Patch of Land and 
Groundfloor loans in this sample are entirely dedicated to residential developments, 
single-family developments being the most prevalent.  Fundrise attracts and pursues 
relationships with major developers in urban areas who tend to be involved in projects of 
higher density and diversity of use.  These distinctions emphasize that a platform’s 
business model directly influences the building type of the investment opportunities they 
offer to investors.     
The Crowd Funds Hard Costs 
While the crowdfunding campaign objectives vary from project-to-project and 
platform-to-platform, renovation and construction projects are the most prevalent type of 
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project objective across the three sets of investment opportunities analyzed.  The 
successful funding of renovation projects contributes to the improvement of the existing 
built environment.  Real estate crowdfunding can finance development items other than 
hard costs.  Project objectives such as pre-development loans for design services and 
acquisition only loans are examples of alternative crowdfunding finance project 
objectives found in the study. 
Positive Social Impact Is Not Guaranteed 
There is no evidence of that any of the three platforms assessed the social impact 
of funded projects. For instance, no details are provided regarding affordability of 
multifamily developments.  Single-family renovations and acquisitions and renovations 
models are generally pursued by developers following a “fix-and-flip” model – by which 
a property is expected to significantly increase its value due to renovations and additions.  
Property “flipping” has been associated with effects of gentrification and increase of 
property values that affect affordability in neighborhoods and cities. 
One investment opportunity in Groundfloor highlighted its positive social purpose 
in order to attract investors.  The description for this single-family residential renovation 
investment opportunity reads: “renovation loan in conjunction with the Atlanta Police 
Foundation to restore a blighted 3 bed, 2 bath house so that a deserving Atlanta Police 
Officer and family can live in-town”.   The investment opportunity is the result of a 
partnership between Groundfloor and the Atlanta Police Foundation (AFP) (Woods, 
2014).  The AFP’s Secure Neighborhoods Initiative task is to provide affordable housing 
alternatives for police officers to reside within the city of Atlanta and the communities 
they police.  Communities benefit from residing officers who are invested in the 
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communities they serve and offices are able to access affordable housing alternatives 
within the city and close to their places of work.  
One hundred and one investors funded the $75,000-loan for the project on 
January 13th 2015, after just less than 2 months of investment availability.  Investors were 
willing to accept a lower return on investment rate (ROI) of 7% as compared to the sites 
average of 12.9%.  One possibility is that the funders balanced the lower ROI with the 
positive social impact and purpose of the project. Upon complete payback of investment 
to funders, the 146 Ericson St. project in Atlanta, GA, will serve as an example of equity 




CHAPTER 3: BUILDING AN ADU: COSTS AND REVENUE 
There is not one single and universally applicable financing method for ADUs.  
The conditions around which ADUs are developed are unique to each parcel.  The 
physical constraints of the site, availability of area, are unique in each case; they affect 
the design and costs of the ADU.  However, more relevant to finances is the ownership 
structure of a lot or lots. The ownership structure is a major factor affecting financing of 
ADUs, especially Alley Flats.  
Numerous ownership structures can be devised in order to advance the 
construction of Alley Flats.  The 2008 Report on The Alley Flat Initiative, published by 
the Center for Sustainable Development at The University of Texas at Austin, highlights 
five ownership structures: individual homeowners, non-profit developers, private 
developers, neighborhood development organizations, and community land trusts 
(UTCSD, 2008).  Each of these ownership structures has limitations and advantages to 
the construction of Alley Flats, and, incidentally, provision of affordable housing in 
ADUs in Austin.   
This research is concerned with studying the potential of real estate equity 
crowdfunding in only one of these ownership structures: individual owners living in the 
primary dwelling unit of a parcel.  More specifically, the analysis will be geared towards 
evaluating crowdfunding as a financing alternative for individual owners who would not 
be able to access traditional financing means, namely Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.   
This chapter analyzes the relocation dynamics of legacy homeowners, property 
owners with unchanged deeds between 1992 and 2002, in four major neighborhoods of 




properties in the four neighborhoods studied have decreased in number by 48% between 
2002 and 2015.  Presumably, legacy homeowners acquired their properties at a time, 
1992 and before, when affordable single-family housing units close to the urban core 
were available.   
Diverse factors have contributed to the increase in relocation of legacy 
homeowners from East Austin and the trend is not changing.  Legacy properties are being 
acquired at market rate values and developed for sale at market rates too.  Increasing 
property taxes are a major issue altering the affordability of homeowner properties.  
This chapter will address the potential of equity crowdfunding as applied to real 
estate in providing financing for the scenario previously described.  The data presented in 
Chapter 1 will guide assumptions about equity crowdfunding in real estate.  Research on 
past and current housing trends in Austin will inform assumptions about development 
costs, operational expenses, revenue and taxes. The chapter concludes with an assessment 
of the potential of crowdfunding and recommendations to individual homeowners, 




PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT COSTS ASSUMPTIONS 
Hard Costs 
Construction Cost Assumptions 
 The Alley Flat Initiative Design Catalog 2015 (ACDDC, 2015) estimates 
construction costs per square foot for Alley Flats to be $147. This estimate is derived 
from the construction cost of an Alley Flat in the Holly Neighborhood. I consulted RS 
Means’ Square Foot Estimator and City Cost Indexes in order to evaluate the Design 
Catalog assumption for construction cost.   
Using RS Means’ Square Foot Estimator, I obtained an average per square foot 
construction cost. The Square Foot Estimator Tool allows the user to input a number of 
variables about the project in case. Since we used the student version, certain capabilities 
of the tool were limited. However, the model was developed to replicate the parameters 
of an Alley Flat as closely as possible.  
The average construction per square foot of a residential unit during the fourth 
quarter of 2015 is $183.70. Major assumptions of the model include: building area of 
1,1000 sf, the maximum allowed by ADU regulations in Austin, a contractor service fee 
of 10%, and one fully-equipped bathroom and kitchen (Appendix 1 RSMeans Sheet 1).  
Given the particular and specific design required by each Alley Flat, note that the 
model’s building quality was set to “Custom”, a setting that implies high quality finishes 
and skilled labor. Using the same model parameters but replacing “Custom” building 
quality with “Average” building quality, the cost per square footage of the model is 
$148.48 (Appendix 2 RS Means Sheet 2).   
The Square Foot Estimator provides estimates based on national average costs.  




Means platform, containing average construction indexes for 731 US and Canadian cities 
(See Appendix 3 City Cost Indexes). The catalog displays relative percentage factors of 
material and installation costs relative to national averages. The City of Austin’s City 
Cost Index during the fourth quarter of 2015 was 83.8. On average construction costs, 
which includes material and installation costs, in the City of Austin are about 26% less 
expensive than the national average. Given City of Austin’s City Cost Index and the price 
per square foot of construction range previously calculated, between $148.88 and 
$183.70, the geographically weighted construction cost per square foot range is between 
$124.76 and $154.94. The geographically weighted RS Means construction cost per 
square footage mean value is $139.85. 
The findings from consulting RS Means for average residential construction costs 
in Austin for structures similar to previous Alley Flats confirms the relative accuracy of 
the $147 construction cost per square foot assumption. The relatively specific and unique 
design and development requirements of each Alley Flat may contribute to the higher 
construction costs of the ACDDC estimates. For the purposes of this research the 
assumed value for construction costs of ADUs is the result of averaging ACDDC’s 
construction cost estimates and custom quality residential construction cost according to 
RS Means data. Specifically, the construction cost for financing considerations in this 
study will be assumed to be $151—the average between the maximum cost of RSMeans 
analysis and ACDDC estimates  Table 3.1, in the next page, summarizes the construction 





Table 3.1 – Summary of residential construction costs 
Soft Costs  
Design Fees 
When an owner agrees to build an Alley Flat using the services of ACDDC they 
benefit from a reduced design service fee. Typically, ACDDC will request a 5% design 
fee based on total construction costs of the project (ACDDC, 2015). In exchange, the 
owner must assure that the unit built will remain affordable, according to affordability 
standards set by the City of Austin’s S.M.A.R.T. Housing program, for the 5 years 
following completion of construction. Not only will the owner’s commitment to 
S.M.A.R.T. Housing rental caps reduce professional design fees but also will result in the 
waiver of development costs associated with permitting from the City of Austin.   
For the purposes of this research, we assume the individual owner will seek 
services from a firm similar to ACDDC, where a considerable reduction of design fees as 
part of the benefits from pursuing the construction of an Alley Flat are provided to the 
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$148.88 $183.70 $124.76 $154.94 $139.85
Weighted Values for City of Austin, TX
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property owner. Therefore, we assume a design service fee of 5%, aligned to ACDDC’s 
business model, for the purposes of this research.  
Land Costs 
Land costs are not considered in the scenarios presented in this research. 
Individual homeowners are assumed to already hold complete ownership of the land and 
primary dwelling unit in the site. In either case, the land cost is not a consideration in the 
estimation of development costs.  
Other Considerations and Contingency 
Additional significant costs may considerably affect the development costs of an 
Alley Flat. For instance, the connection of the ADU to the existing city water service 
infrastructure network may require the installation of a new connection whenever the 
existing connection line is not adequate due to the increased demand resulting from the 
additional unit on-site. According to ACDDC’s previous experience on this issue, such a 
scenario requiring an upgrade of a property’s water tap would add approximately an 
additional $2,700 of engineering professional fees and construction costs ranging 
between $10,000 and $20,000 to the project budget. Assuming a baseline construction 
area of 1,100 sq ft and a mid range water tab upgrade cost of $17,700, the site 
improvement would add about $16 per sq ft to the construction cost of the project.  
Assuming a $151 per sq ft construction cost, a circumstance requiring a water utility 
improvement of this type on a site would increase construction costs by 10.5%. 
Unexpected administrative costs related to difficult procurement, feasibility and 
permitting stages of development are less significant compared to utility improvements, 




changes loosen the permitting constraints around ADUs, and although Alley Flats benefit 
from waiving and expediting of certain permitting costs via the S.M.A.R.T housing 
program, issues regarding neighborhood plans can delay permitting and add unforeseen 
administrative costs. For instance, while working through the permitting process in 
Clarksville, ACDDC and the Clarksville Community Development Corporation have 
faced additional costs due to district designations within the neighborhood. The property 
they are working on is located within a historic district. The permitting process for this 
Alley Flat will require a review from the Historic Landmarks Commission—adding a 
$1,000 fee for the review, delaying the permitting process significantly, and resulting in 
additional administrative costs. 
A contingency is a portion of the development cost reserved to address unknown 
conditions and costs that cannot be recovered (DelPico, 2004, p. 377). Properly setting 
contingency allowances can help address unforeseen needs such as the water utility 
upgrade or additional administrative and permitting costs previously explained.  
For the purposes of the models presented in this research, we do not account for 
additional and extraordinary development costs presented by issues such as water and 
electric utility upgrades or issues with City of Austin procurement and development 
permits. Ideally, in the future, such costs should be mitigated given the interest of the city 
to develop additional affordable units, Alley Flats, close to the urban core. On projects 
with constrained financing, a significant cost such as a water utility connection upgrade 
will significantly affect the feasibility of the project. This research assumes a project 
contingency of 2% of estimated construction cost added to the soft costs of the project in 
order to account for unexpected costs and expenses during development and construction 




PROPERTY OPERATIONAL EXPENSES ASSUMPTIONS  
Exemptions and Property Taxes 
Building an ADU on a legacy homeowner property, regardless of its rental 
affordability, translates to a $60,436 average increase to the appraised value of the 
property, or an 18% increase of appraised property values. Higher property values will 
increase the legacy homeowner’s property tax burden. The average increase in appraised 
value is explained later in this chapter (Figures 3.5 and 3.6 summarize these findings).   
A vast majority of legacy homeowners in 2012, in the Chestnut-Rosewood (90%) 
and ECC–Holly (94%) study areas, had homestead exemptions in place (PODER, 2012). 
Similarly, in both study areas about two thirds of legacy homeowners had homestead 
exemptions for adults over age 65 or older in place (PODER, 2012). Homestead 
exemptions provide relief of tax burden to property owners by reducing the assessed 
property value upon which property taxes are levied. In Texas, taxation policy offers a 
property tax Homestead exemption of up to 20%. The City of Austin has set its 
homestead exemption rate to 6% for FY 2016 (Green, 2015). The tax exemption for 
adults over 65 years of age is related to school district taxes; it sets a ceiling for school 
taxes, which may not increase as long as no major improvements are completed on the 
property. Over 65 age exemptions are less prevalent and less consistent over time than 
the Homestead exemptions in the study sample. Consequently the financing scenarios 
only assume 6% Homestead exemption on the appraised property values.  
Homestead exemptions do not apply to the entire property value once an ADU is 
constructed on a Homestead exemption eligible property if the ADU is being rented. 
Only if the ADU is treated as an extension of the homeowner’s homestead will 




Since this research is interested in the financing mechanisms for the development of 
Alley Flats, affordable rental ADU units, the financing scenarios will only apply 
Homestead exemption to the value of the property’s main housing unit. 
Property taxes for the 2015-2016 City of Austin Budget were set to 45.89 cents 
per $100 property valuation (Green, 2015). Data from Travis County’s Taxation 
Summary reveals that, in the last five fiscal years, City of Austin property tax rates have 
ranged from the current value of 45.89 cents per $100 of valuation up to 50.29 cents per 
$100 of valuation in 2012. The financing scenarios will assume a constant property tax 




PROPERTY VALUES BEFORE AND AFTER ADU CONSTRUCTION 
Legacy Homeowners in Major East Austin Neighborhoods 
The scenarios for financing in this research, as previously mentioned in the 
Research Focus section of this Chapter, are based upon legacy homeowners benefitting 
from the additional income from the rental of an ADU on their property while assuming 
the provision of affordable housing. Estimating land and property values of legacy 
properties is relevant in order to set up financing scenarios—especially in order to 
understand the pre-qualification for financing options and property tax burden to legacy 
homeowners.  
In April 2012, PODER, People Organized in Defense of Earth and Her Resources, 
and the East Austin Conservancy released a report titled “Land of Broken Dreams & 
Land of Opportunity” (PODER, 2012). The report reveals homeownership trends related 
to property value increase and its effects on affordability to legacy homeowners. The 
report is centered on the Chestnut, East Cesar Chavez, Holly and Rosewood 
Neighborhoods of East Austin. The rate of change of housing in these neighborhoods is 
calculated by establishing a baseline of legacy homeowners, those who have property 
ownership between 1992 and 2002, and comparing the baseline to 2012 TCAD, Travis 
County Appraisal District, property ownership data. Among other metrics, the report 
provides a Market Value Analysis for properties owned by legacy homeowners, those 
who have remained property owners in 2012 since the 1992 baseline.   
Using the baseline data for the Chestnut-Rosewood Neighborhood sample of 
PODER’s report, the ownership and assessment values for 77 legacy homeowner 
properties identified in these neighborhoods in 2012 were updated using 2015 TCAD 




properties, changed ownership (PODER, 2012).  During the same twenty years, 77 legacy 
homeowners remained in place. Between 2012 and 2015, 27.3% of the legacy 
homeowner properties, 21 out of 77 properties, changed ownership. Cumulatively, 
between 1992 and 2015, more than half of legacy homeowner properties, 58% of 
properties to be precise, changed ownership.     
Following the same methodology applied to update the Chestnut-Rosewood 
dataset, the 331 legacy properties identified in 2012 on the East Cesar Chavez and Holly 
neighborhoods by the Land of Broken Dreams report were updated by consulting 2015 
TCAD data. According to the report, between 1992 and 2012, 32.2% of the legacy 
homeowner properties, 157 out of 488 properties, changed ownership (PODER, 2012). 
During the same twenty years, 331 legacy homeowners remained in place, which was the 
baseline for the 2015 update. Between 2012 and 2015, 18.7% of the legacy homeowner 
properties, 62 out of 331 properties in these neighborhoods, changed ownership. 
Cumulatively, between 1992 and 2015, 44.9% of legacy homeowner properties in the 
East Cesar Chavez and Holly neighborhoods study areas have changed ownership.     
Table 3.2, in the next page, summarizes the analysis of legacy homeownership 
change in time.  Based on the baseline group, those that retained ownership from 1992 to 
2002, for the Chestnut-Rosewood and East Cesar Chavez-Holly neighborhood study 
areas, the table presents property counts for legacy and non-legacy properties for analysis 
time periods of 2002-2012, 2012-2015, and 1992-2015. The table includes the aggregated 
totals for property count and legacy homeownership change for both study areas. In both 
study areas combined, the number of legacy homeowner properties has decreased by 
38.7% between the years of 2002 and 2015. Understanding the housing market dynamics 




translates to the loss of affordable housing units in East Austin, part of the urban core of 
the city. Legacy homeowners with deeds from 1992 and before likely located in these 
neighborhoods due to the affordability of housing at the time and relative proximity to 
Austin’s downtown.   
 
Table 3.2 – Legacy Homeownership Change In Selected Areas Summary 
The increased demand for housing in the urban core and associated increase of 
land and property values in Austin has limited affordability of historically affordable 





























































































































Chestnut - Rosewood Neighborhoods Study Area
Property Count 134 77 57 56 21 134 56
Legacy Homeowner % Change
East Cesar Chavez - Holly Neighborhoods Study Area
Property Count 488 331 157 269 62 488 269
Legacy Homeowner % Change
Aggregated Total (study areas combined)
Property Count 622 408 214 325 83 622 325
Legacy Homeowner % Change







homeownership and affordability loss are a critical part of the research focus, as 
explained at the beginning of the chapter. Figure 3.1 illustrates the accumulated 
homeownership rates of change in the neighborhoods in this study. The average annual 
rate of homeownership change is almost double in the last three years as it had been 
between 2002 and 2012. The acceleration in the average annual rate of change of 
homeownership in these neighborhoods in East Austin suggests that housing affordability 
measures must be considered to preserve the composition of communities in the area.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Change in Legacy Homeowners since 1991, the figure shows the average 





Before ADU: Areas And Appraised Values For Legacy Homeowner Properties In 
Major East Austin Properties 
 
Table 3.3 – Land and improvement areas and values before ADU construction in selected 




































Chestnut - Rosewood Neighborhoods Study Area
Average Values 7,154 1,183 139,714$    112,868$     252,583$    
Minimum 3,023 544 120,000$    44,904$      178,094$    
1st Quartile 5,221 890 120,000$    89,429$      221,314$    
Median 6,140 1,077 120,000$    107,560$    240,238$    
3rd Qaurtile 7,147 1,308 150,000$    122,240$    270,976$    
Maximum 21,061 3,028 210,000$    317,458$    527,458$    
East Cesar Chavez - Holly Neighborhoods Study Area
Average Values 6,354 1,239 183,337$    145,921$    329,259$    
Minimum 2,256 520 102,000$    3,776$        165,335$    
1st Quartile 5,465 919 170,000$    107,501$    281,096$    
Median 6,630 1,136 200,000$    139,656$    329,081$    
3rd Qaurtile 6,951 1,440 200,000$    178,045$    375,211$     
Maximum 27,055 4,158 398,160$    383,379$    622,605$    
Study Areas Combined
Average Values 6,490 1,230 175,821$    140,226$    316,047$    
Minimum 2,256 520 102,000$    3,776$        165,335$    
1st Quartile 5,256 914 150,000$    102,449$    256,470$    
Median 6,555 1,128 200,000$    132,009$    312,029$    
3rd Qaurtile 6,985 1,418 200,000$    170,173$    364,925$    
Maximum 27,055 4,158 398,160$    383,379$    622,605$    




We collected land and improvement value data for legacy homeowner properties 
in 2015, simultaneous to the update of legacy homeownership status in the two study 
areas of East Austin. Table 3.3, found in the previous page, presents a summary of 
finding for appraised values, in addition to each neighborhood’s land and improvement 
square footage. Data for each of the two neighborhood study areas and for both study 
areas combined is reported using a 5 number summary method and average of values.   
Financing scenario baseline assumptions for improvement and land areas and 
values conform to the combined values recorded from the Chestnut-Rosewood and East 
Cesar Chavez-Holly study areas. Outlier minimum and maximum values in the samples 
could result in a misleading median value for the land & improvement areas and appraisal 
values recorded. In consequence, the average values for land & improvement areas and 
appraised values will be used for the financing scenarios.   
Average legacy homeowner property land & improvement areas for both study 
areas combined are 6,490 sq ft and 1,230 sq ft, respectively. As for 2015 legacy 
homeowner properties, average land & improvement TCAD Appraisal Values, in both 
study areas combined, are $175,821 and $140,226, respectively. When aggregating both 
neighborhood study areas, the average land plus property improvement TCAD Appraisal 
value for a legacy homeowner property in 2015 is $316,047.  
Not every one of the legacy homeowner properties remaining in the East Austin 
study areas is eligible for ADU development. From the 325 legacy homeowner properties 
remaining in the study areas in 2015, only 230 properties are equal to or larger than 5,750 
sq ft in land area. City of Austin regulations allow ADU construction by right on SF-3 
zoned lots 5,750 sq ft in area or larger. Approximately 71% of the legacy homeowners in 




Austin ordinances allowing ADUs, by right, on SF-3 lot areas equal or greater than 7,000 
sq ft would have only enabled 81 out 325 legacy homeowners to develop ADUs. Had 
ADU regulations not been changed in November 19th, 2015 by City Council, only 25% of 
the identified legacy homeowners would have been able to develop, construct, and 
perceive the economic benefits of rental income from an ADU in their property. More 
considerations go into ADU feasibility, but, by only limiting feasibility to zoning district 
and lot size, regulation changes have increased by approximately 45% the number of 
legacy homeowners who could potentially build an ADU, including possibly an Alley 
Flat, on their properties. 
While the impact of regulatory loosening is evident, note that the Neighborhood 
Districts in the study area had special use infill options in place that allowed for ADUs in 
lots 5,750 sq ft or larger (see Appendix 4, special infill CoA document). The 45% 
increase in lots with ADUs allowed by right in the study area may shed light onto the 






Table 3.4 – Average areas and appraisal values for all study areas and for ADU eligible 
properties only 
Table 3.4 presents and contrasts area and appraisal average values for (1) study 
areas combined and (2) ADU-eligible properties within the combined study areas. When 
compared, the average appraised values and areas for all legacy homeowner properties 
and those eligible to build an ADU by right present some important differences. Given 
that lots with areas smaller than 5,5750 sq ft are removed from the sample for ADU-
eligible properties, the average land area increases by 888 sq ft, averaging 7,378 sq ft. 
Similarly, improvements increased by 83 sq ft, averaging 1,312 sq ft for ADU-eligible 
properties. Because land and improvement areas increased in this sample, we can assume 
that average appraisal values for ADU-eligible properties will be greater than those for 
the sample including all legacy homeowner properties combined. In fact, data shows that 





































Average Values 6,490 1,230 175,821$    140,226$    316,047$    
ADU Eligible Properties (Lot Area 5,750 sq ft or greater)
Average Values 7,378 1,312 188,653$    153,993$    342,647$    
Avg, Value Differences 888 83 12,833$      13,767$      26,600$      




is $342,647. In other words, average appraised value of legacy homeowner properties 
eligible for ADU construction is 8.2% higher than the average appraised value of all 
legacy property owners in the study area.   
The financing scenarios make use of average land and improvement areas and 
appraised values for the group of legacy homeowner properties with land areas of 5,750 





After ADU: Estimated Appraised Values For Existing Properties With ADUs In 
Study Area Neighborhoods 
The most thorough evaluation of existing ADUs in Austin was performed in 2008 
by The University of Texas at Austin School of Architecture in collaboration with the 
Center for Sustainable Development (CSD, 2008). In the 2008 Report on The Alley Flat 
Initiative, data from TCAD’s property roll was processed using GIS analysis in order to 
arrive at an approximate per neighborhood count of ADUs and Alley Flats. Average 
values for ADU, primary home and land are also provided.   
TCAD seeks to fairly determine property values. As such, TCAD land and 
improvement values can be used as measures of market values. The average ADU, 
primary home and land reported in 2008 for SF-3 lots with existing ADUs located in 
Chestnut, Rosewood, East Cesar Chavez, and Holly neighborhoods is projected to follow 
historical trends of home values in Austin. Based on historic listing and sales data, 
Zillow, an online real estate portal, provides a city-wide Home Value Index dating back 
to 2007 and projecting as far as one year in the future. More than the actual home value, 
we are interested in the percent increase of home value between 2008 and 2015 in order 
to project the findings of the 2008 Alley Flat report onto approximate current property 
values for properties within the study area and ADUs built on the lot. 
  Figure 3.1 is a chart showing historical home values in Austin according to 
Zillow. Appendix 4 defines and introduces the methodology behind the Zillow home 
value tool. All homes, from studios to 5+ bedroom single-family residential properties 
are included in the dataset displayed. In general, we can observe a steady increase in 
home values in Austin during the 2008-2016 period.  One can identify the characteristic 
real estate cycles in the graph; peaks in value followed by decreased values due to 




production. Bumps are followed by increased market value due to housing unit 
production resuming, a given location becoming more attractive to population, among 
many other factors. These cycles are fairly consistent but they happen amidst a fairly 
consistent overall increase in home values across time. In January 2008, the average 
home value in Austin, according to this dataset, was $215,000. By contrast, in January 
2016, Zillow estimated the average home value in Austin to be $291,000. In eight years, 
between 2008 and 2016, the average home value in Austin increased by $76,000, or 
35.3%. Refer to Appendix 4 and Figure 3.2 for more information about the Zillow Home 
Value Index and how it is calculated. Readers must consider that Zillow’s Home Value 
Index includes the greater Austin area, not only the urban core. More than likely, the rate 
of value increase in central Austin is greater than the greater area of the city. In an ideal 
scenario, this estimate would be done using property sales data of the relevant 
neighborhoods in order to gauge the increase in property value.  However, such data is 
not readily available to the researchers given that the State of Texas does not require 
disclosure of property transactions by law.  
 




Table 3.5 presents a summary of count, ADU value, primary home value, and 
land value for SF-3 lots with existing Accessory Dwelling units as reported by the 2008 
Report on The Alley Flat Initiative. All four relevant neighborhoods are listed. Then, 
average values for all four neighborhoods are combined and projected to 2016 values 
using a 35.3% city-wide home value increase, determined from Zillow historical home 
value data.  
 












































































Chestnut - Rosewood Neighborhoods Study Area
Chestnut Neighborhood 118 42,231$   78,188$   98,197$   122,099$ 220,296$ 
Rosewood Neighborhood 60 44,016$   85,970$   91,469$   131,813$ 223,282$ 
Chestnut - Rosewood Combined 178 43,124$   82,079$   94,833$   126,956$ 221,789$ 
East Cesar Chavez - Holly Neighborhoods Study Area
East Cesar Chavez Neighborhood 119 48,275$   83,086$   101,269$ 138,185$ 239,454$ 
Holly Neighborhood 119 43,887$   89,565$   106,547$ 135,179$ 241,726$ 
ECC - Holly Combined 238 46,081$   86,326$   103,908$ 136,682$ 240,590$ 
Aggregated Total (study areas combined)
2008 Values 416 44,602$   84,202$   99,371$   131,819$ 231,190$ 
2015 Values 60,436$   114,094$ 134,647$ 178,615$ 313,262$ 
(35.5% Home Value Increase)





The analysis done in the 2008 Alley Flat Initiative Report reveals the Average 
ADU Value for SF-3 Lots with Existing ADU lots at the time. In order to estimate the 
average value for an ADU completed in 2016, the average ADU value for the four 
neighborhoods in 2008 was calculated and, then, adjusted to the 35.5% average home 
value increase previously explained. An average appraised value for completed ADUs in 
of $60,436 will be assumed and added to the average legacy homeowner property 
appraised values in the study area (see Table 3.5). The average property value for a 
legacy homeowner property without an ADU, according to the analysis summarized in 
Table 3.4, is $342,647. Financing scenarios will assume a post-ADU construction 
appraised property value of $403,083.   
OPERATIONAL AND CAPITAL EXPENSES 
Operating expenses (OpEx) and capital expenses (CapEx) for the financing 
scenario are set at 4% of the ADU net rental income. Operational expenses related to 
utilities in the ADU are assumed to be carried by those leasing the property. The utility 
costs associated with the ADU are considered as part of the tenant’s living costs and 
count towards the 30% of income living cost for S.MA.R.T Housing (see Property 
Operational Revenue Assumptiona Section).    
INSURANCE COSTS 
According to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the average 
annual value for home insurance costs in Texas for 2015 was $1,661, which translates to 




ADU to the property according to ACCDC experience, the financing scenarios in this 





PROPERTY OPERATIONAL REVENUE ASSUMPTIONS  
Rental Revenue 
The Alley Flat Initiative model calls for compliance with S.M.A.R.T. Housing 
rent provisions. S.M.A.R.T Housing stands for Safe, Mixed Income, Accessible, 
Reasonably Priced, and Transit Oriented Housing. The policy initiative is run by the City 
of Austin and is designed to stimulate the production of housing for low and moderate 
income residents of Austin (CoA Neighborhood Housing and Community Development, 
2008). As previously mentioned in this chapter, legacy homeowners who choose to 
develop an Alley Flat with ACDDC benefit from a reduction on professional design fees. 
From a S.M.A.R.T Housing perspective, by committing to adjust ADU rents to the 
policy’s guidelines, legacy homeowners benefit from an expedited permit review process 
and save up to 100% of the fees associated with permitting, estimated at about $1,500 per 
ADU developed.   
The Alley Flat Initiative financial model complies with the S.M.A.R.T Housing 
policy affordability requirement for “reasonably-priced” rental units. The legacy 
homeowner agrees to preserve the ADU unit on “reasonably-priced” rental rates for at 
least 5 years after completion. Rental rates for S.M.A.R.T Housing are based on Median 
Family Income (MFI) for the Austin-Round Rock MSA (see Appendix 6). MSA stands 
for Metropolitan Statistical Area. MSAs are defined by the Federal Office of 
Management and Budget and typically used by the Census Bureau for statistical 
purposes. An MSA is a geographically significant area with an urban core, which has 
significant economic relationships with its surroundings. Under the policy, rents charged 




“reasonably-priced” rental units must not earn more than the 80% of the Austin-Round 
Rock MFI.  
For the purposes of the financial models to be developed, rental revenue will be 
modeled based on the 80% MFI for a 2 person household, assuming that the 1,100 sq ft 
ADU will be rented by a minimum of two people. The 80% MFI for a 2 person 
household in the Austin-Round Rock MSA is $49,200. Rental rates are capped at 30% of 
gross income. Since operational expenses for the landlord do not account for ADU-
related utility costs and tenant housing costs must not exceed 30% of their income, in 
addiction, and according to City of Austin S.M.A.R.T. Housing Manual (see Appendix 
7), tenant utility costs are estimated at 2% of their living expenses. Consequently, for the 
purposes of the financial models in this research, Alley Flat Initiative rental is limited to 
28% of the tenant’s income, which is based on “reasonably-affordable” S.M.A.R.T 
Housing policy provisions results in annual gross rent revenue of $13,776 and a monthly 





CHAPTER 4: FINANCING AN ADU: CROWDFUNDING SCENARIO 
Hard Costs (HC) Building Area 1100 sq ft
Construction Cost (per sq ft) 151$         Avg. ADU Value (2016) 60,436$     
Total Construction Cost 166,100$   
Soft Cost (SC)
Design Fee (5% HC) 8,305$       
Contingency (2% HC) 3,322$       
Land Cost (LC)
Total Development Cost 177,727$   Before ADU Completion
avg. parcel area 7378 sq ft
avg. improvement area 1312 sq ft
Revenue avg. appraised value 342,646$   
Rent Income avg. land value 188,653$   
80% MFI for Austin-RR MSA 49,200$     / yr avg. improvement value 153,993$   
S.M.A.R.T. Housing Rent 13,776$     / yr After ADU Completion
1,148$       / mo  parcel area 7378 sq ft
 improvement area 2412 sq ft
Expenses appraised value 403,082$   
Property Insurance 158$         / mo
Operational Expenses (2% PGI) 23$           / mo Property Tax
Capital Expenses (2% NOI) 17$           / mo Tax Rate 2.50%
Homestead Exemp. Rate 6.00%
ADU Property Tax 126$         / mo After ADU Completion
Main Unit Property Tax 671$         / mo Total MV 403,082$   
ADU MV 60,436$     
ADU Property Tax 1,511$       / yr
126$         / mo
Land + Improvement MV 342,646$   
Homestead Exemp. (-6%) 322,087$   
Main Unit Property Tax 8,052$       / yr
671$         / mo
Legacy homeowner properties: no deed changes since 
1992 in Rosewood/Chestnut, ECC/Holly 
neighborhoods in East Austin. Parcels consideresd 
are 5,750sq ft or larger.
28% of tenant MFI (2% for 
operations allocated to tenant)
Operational Revenue & Expenses
Development Costs ADU Characteristics
Property Characteristics
 
Table 4.1 – ADU development costs and operational expenses and revenue 
Table 4.1 summarizes the assumptions for development costs and operational 
expenses and revenue streams explained throughout Chapter 3. These assumptions are 




estimations for properties located in the Chestnut-Rosewood and East Cesar Chavez-
Holly neighborhoods study areas. The revenue model is based on providing “reasonably-
priced” rental housing for, at least, the first 5 years after project completion following 
S.M.A.R.T. housing.  
Table 4.2 sums up the projected cashflow proforma resulting from the 
development of an ADU on legacy a legacy homeowner’s parcel. After accounting for 
OpEx, property taxes related to the new ADU only, CapEx and CapEx contingency, a 
total of $807 per month remains available to the landlord. The Net Cash Flow From 
Operations should, at least, cover the debt service for the development. Preferably, the 
cash flow after debt service will exceed the amount needed to simply break even, leaving 
some cash flow for the legacy homeowner to fund property taxes on the main unit.  
 
Potential Revenue
Rent Revenue 13,776$    / yr
Potential Gross Income (PGI) 13,776$    / yr N/A
(-) Operational Expenses 2,172$      / yr N/A
(-) Property Taxes 1,511$      / yr 8,052$      / yr
Net Operating Income (NOI) 10,094$    / yr
841$        / mo
Potential Expenses
(-) CAPEX (2% NOI) 202$        / yr
(-) CAPEX Contingency (2% NOI) 202$        / yr
Net Cash Flow From Operations 9,690$      / yr








FINANCING SCENARIO: REAL ESTATE CROWDFUNDING 
Earlier in this thesis, Chapter 2 presented the findings from an analysis of 3 real 
estate equity crowdfunding platforms.  Its findings were summarized in Table 2.1. I now 
integrate those findings with the specifics of ADU project development.   
The relationship of real estate equity crowdfunding and residential development, 
be it multifamily or single family, is quite evident from the platforms analysis. 
Development of ADUs aligns with the tendency of real estate equity crowdfunding 
platforms to fund residential projects. Projects seeking crowdfunding are mostly 
associated with renovations of existing properties. While the construction of an ADU is 
not exactly a renovation project, it can be considered an improvement project.   
No ADU development projects were found across the 167 projects reviewed 
during the real estate equity crowdfunding platform analysis. While the absence of ADU 
development projects in these platforms may be perceived as a challenge for ADU 
projects to be successful in the equity crowdfunding market, it may also present an 
opportunity to attract investors due to its innovative character. In fact, Maketto, one of 
the pioneering projects in the real estate crowdfunding market, which is discussed in the 
Fundrise section of Chapter 2, exhibits similarities with ADU development as an urban 
infill project. The innovative and local character of the project attracted investors in the 
community. ADUs developed in legacy homeowner properties have a potential 
associated social equity outcome: enabling historic neighbors to remain in their 
homesteads and, in the case, providing a new “reasonably-affordable” rental-housing unit 
in the urban core. These associated outcomes may attract the interest of progressive 
investors looking for opportunities to invest in projects with positive community and 




In Chapter 2, the uncertainty regarding social impact of crowdfunded projects is 
discussed. A project funded through the Groundfloor platform is highlighted as the only 
project with clear social impact purpose in the entire sample of investment opportunities 
surveyed. As described in Chapter 2, the project secured a $75,000 loan to renovate a 
blighted home that housed a Atlanta Police Department officer after completion.. This 
project in Atlanta is evidence that investors are willing to sacrifice maximizing their 
return of investment in return for a project’s social outcomes.  
The real question is to what extent the structure of real estate crowdfunding 
platforms and the investment opportunities they offer are appropriate for the development 
of Alley Flats in legacy homeowner properties—a development product with guaranteed 
social equity outcomes related to housing affordability and community preservation. 
DEFINING AN APPROPRIATE CROWDFUNDING FINANCE TYPE 
As discussed in Chapter 2, every real estate equity crowdfunding platform has 
different profiles of investment opportunities, developer types, and financing products for 
borrowers. Two main types of products are available in real estate equity crowdfunding: 
equity investments and peer-to-peer loans. Equity investments provide investors with 
equity on a property: they participate in the cash flow of the property and appreciation 
when the property is sold. Peer-to-peer loans work like a traditional loan only in that they 
are financed by “peers,” in this case, individuals pooling their capital via the online 
platform to fund the loan product. Like in a traditional loan, peer-to-peer loans pay 
interest and are secured by real property.  
By contrast, equity investment opportunities are geared towards larger 
development projects backed by institutional or corporate developers. Certain platforms 




known for focusing on this kind of investment product and partnerships. On the other 
hand, certain platforms such as Patch of Land, also one of the platforms reviewed in 
Chapter 2, mostly provide peer-to-peer lending opportunities. 
The development of Alley Flats on legacy homeowner properties does not 
conform to the equity type of real estate crowdfunding investment deals. Peer-to-peer 
loans, however, initially appear to provide appropriate conditions for legacy homeowners 
to finance the construction of an Alley Flat on their properties. Findings from the 
platform analysis in Chapter 2 reveal that the type of borrower that customarily uses peer-
to-peer lending platforms conforms to the profile of independent and entrepreneurial 
builders and developers. Borrowers of this profile are especially prevalent in the 
investment opportunities available via Patch of Land. The analysis of real estate equity 
crowdfunding’s potential as an alternative financing mechanism for Alley Flat 
development in legacy homeowner properties will be evaluated based on the 
crowdlending model, in other words, peer-to-peer lending.  
ASSUMPTIONS FOR FINANCING VIA CROWDFUNIDNG LENDING 
Patch of Land’s platform loans are based on Loan To Value Ratio (LTV) and 
After Repair Values (ARV).  LTV requirements establish that LTV must not exceed 
80%, which in turn demands a minimum downpayment of 20%. On the other hand, Patch 
of Land will offer products lending up to 70% of ARV. Given the before and after ADU 
completion property values (see Table 4.1), the total construction cost of $177,727 does 
not exceed the 70% ARV rule and would require a minimum downpayment of of 
$36,612, once origination and closing fees are considered.   
Compared to other traditional means of financing, equity crowdfunding deals 




and up to 5 years. Logically, shorter terms translate to higher payments by the borrower.  
Higher debt premium payments translate in compromised affordability for the borrower, 
in this case the legacy property owner. To minimize debt premiums, loan terms will be 
maximized, based on data collected for the real estate crowdfunding platform analysis, 
and assumed to be 5 years.  
Typical Annual Return on Investment (ROI) for equity crowdfunding and 
crowdlending platforms varies depending on the platforms and the type of product. In 
Chapter 2, findings reveal that ROIs on products from the three platforms analyzed can 
vary from as low as 6.0% to as high as 25.8%.  The 146 Ericson project, in Atlanta, GA, 
presented at the end of Chapter 2, demonstrated that projects with social equity outcomes 
and a strong organizational support behind it could achieve funding through 
crowdfunding at lower rates. The police housing initiative exemplified in the 146 Ericson 
project offered an ROI of 7.0%. Via a telephone conversation, a Patch of Land 
representative commented on plans to release mid-term products by May 2016 with ROIs 
as low as 6.5% and terms as long as 5 years. Given the precedent of 146 Ericson St., the 
financing model for ADUs in this chapter will assume an ROI of 7.0%. 
Crowdfunding platforms charge borrowers service fees, also known as origination 
and closing fees. In general, results from the survey of platforms presented in Chapter 2 
showed that platforms typically apply service fees between 3 and 4 points. For the 





Mid-Term Crowdfunding Lending Model
Construction Cost 177,727$   
ROI 6.5%
Max. LTV 80%
Origination and Closing Fees 3.0%
5,332$       
Term 5 yrs
Loan Amount 183,059$   
Equity Needed 36,612$     
Principal After Downpayment 146,447$   
PMT (Excel)
Annual Payment 35,240-$     
PMT (Formula)
k 0.2406
Annual Payment 35,240$     
 
Table 4.3 – Summary Of Assumptions For Crowdfunding Loan  
Table 4.3 summarizes the assumptions previously explained in this section. The 
origination and closing fees from the crowdfunding platform add $5,332 to the loan 
amount, totaling $183,059. In this scenario, the downpayment required for the loan 
amount is $36,612.   
Two methods are used to compute annual payment for the loan. The first method 
used Microsoft Excel PMT function. The second method used was to calculate the k 
value from which to derive an annual payment. Both methods estimate the five-year loan 
term would require an annual payment of $35,240.   
DEBT SERVICE ON PROPERTY CASH FLOW 
Once the annual debt service is taken into consideration on the property’s ADU 




lending does not appear to be a viable option for legacy homeowners interested in 
building Alley Flats in their properties. Table 4.4 shows Before Tax Cash Flow (BTCF) 
for the development of an ADU under previously explained assumptions.  
Potential Revenue
Rent Revenue 13,776$    / yr
Potential Gross Income (PGI) 13,776$    / yr N/A
(-) Operational Expenses 2,172$      / yr N/A
(-) Property Taxes 1,511$      / yr 8,052$      / yr
Net Operative Income (NOI) 10,094$    / yr
841$        / mo
Potential Expenses
(-) CAPEX (2% NOI) 202$        / yr
(-) CAPEX Contingency (2% NOI) 202$        / yr
Net Cash Flow From Operations 9,690$      / yr
807$        / mo
(-) Annual Debt Service 35,240$    /yr
Before Tax Cash Flow (BTCF) 25,550-$    /yr
2,129-$      /mo
ADU MAIN UNIT
AFI + Main Unit Cashflow Proforma 
owner income
 
Table 4.4 – Before Tax Cash Flow Summary 
The annual debt service almost quadruples the property’s net cash flow from 
operations. Assuming no vacancy and maximized S.M.A.R.T. Housing rental rates, a 
best-case scenario for revenue, BTCF for the project is -$25,550. The legacy homeowner 
carries on the burden of debt service. The legacy homeowner must also be able to pay the 




ADU could fund the property tax of the main unit and guarantee that the legacy 
homeowner could afford housing costs on his or her property. However, once debt 
service from a mid-term crowdfunding peer-to-peer lending product is in place, the 
project is clearly not financially viable.   
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Initially, real estate crowdfunding platforms appeared to provide an opportunity 
for alternative financing. Upon analyzing three different crowdfunding platforms and 
building a scenario for ADU financing using a crowdfunded peer-to-peer loan, findings 
show that, at this time and under current terms, real estate crowdfunding platforms don’t 
offer a financing alternative from traditional lending mechanisms. 
1. The findings of this research are limited to the evaluation of crowdfunding loans 
products, also known as peer-to-peer lending, modeled after the platforms analyzed in 
Chapter 2. Equity crowdfunding may be a viable option for financing Alley Flats in 
the future. However, at this time, a homeowner-led and managed project such as an 
ADU does not fit with the equity crowdfunding products offered in any of the three 
platforms studied.   
2. Crowdfunding loans still requires significant downpayments. Maximum LTV ratios 
vary from platform to platform, but generally do not exceed 80%. Under such terms, 
a legacy homeowner would have to afford a downpayment of $36,612 in order to 
build a 1,100sq ft ADU in his or her property. Equity crowdfunding and crowdfunded 
peer-to-peer loans are similar to traditional lending products; they require significant 
equity from the borrower in order to approve financing.  
3. Loan terms are vary from platform to platform, as explained in Chapter 2. Peer-to-




mortgages offer up to 30 years of financing which translate to far lower debt service 
payments compared to those from crowdfunding loans.  
4. Groundfloor, one of the crowdfunding platforms analyzed, does not finance owner-
occupied projects or consumer financing. After understanding the debt service 
premiums associated with a crowdfunding platform, Groundfloor’s business model 
appears logical. Developers and firms with an interest to improve property in order to 
refinance or sell it would be interested in short-term and high-interest financing, not 
homeowners. Borrowers need significant capital, cashflow or refinancing in place in 
order to afford the hefty debt services of a crowdfunding loan or to even afford an 
interest only crowdfunding loan with balloon payment. As the platform analysis in 
Chapter 2 shows, a great share of projects relying on crowdfunding financing is 
managed by professional real estate organizations. These projects tend to have a 
refinancing or improvement and sale ultimate purpose. Professional real estate 
organizations have access to capital to afford crowdfunding financing during the 
project’s completion and manage to profit from the projects completion once 
refinanced or sold.   
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Regardless of how they are referred to or what their development model is 
Secondary Dwelling Units in Austin, TX and elsewhere in the United States face a 
challenge stronger than that of zoning regulations. In Austin, TX allowing for larger 
ADUs on more lots will not be enough incentive to encourage the fulfillment of the 
original Alley Flats vision—ADUs that can preserve legacy homeownership and provide 




real estate development of ADUs, financing mechanisms of the units remain the largest 
limitation to the promise of Alley Flats and ADUs in the city.  
Limitations around ADU development via traditional funding mechanisms have 
been previously presented in this research. Even as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac begin to 
recognize rental income as part of the debt-to-income ratio of debtors, other limitations 
will continue to hamper ad-hoc developer access to traditional lending capital. For 
instance, the lack of appropriate property records on ADUs in cities will limit the 
capacity of lenders to evaluate proposed ADUs. Typically, lenders will compare a 
proposed asset with similar assets in the surroundings of a given site. We can safely 
assume that numerous ADUs have been developed over many years and many have not 
been appropriately registered. On the other hand, ADUs may not be considered an 
individual property type in many county property tax registries—such as is the case in 
Travis County. For traditional lending mechanisms to finance ADUs under the same 
conditions as other property types, then, ADU properties must be properly recorded and 
the data necessary for lending assessment to be completed needs to be publicly available 
and transparent.  
Even once ADUs become a mainstream property type and asset class, and 
traditional lending mechanisms become more easily accessible for ad-hoc developers, 
borrowers with similar limitations than those legacy homeowners face will remain having 
difficulty accessing traditional means of financing. The down payment requirement and 
credit pre-classification completed by creditors are two examples of barriers upon the 
development of ADUs within programs such as the Alley Flat Initiative. City of Austin 
offers a Down Payment Assistance Program (DPA) that provides deferred 0% interest 




increased long-term rental affordability could be set up for legacy homeowners planning 
to build Alley Flats on their properties. The concern of lender credit history and 
qualification is a more complex one that would require further collaboration between 
lenders and stakeholders promoting ADU development and, specifically, ADU 
development models with social equity in mind. 
Findings of this research reveal that crowdfunding is not a viable alternative 
financing mechanism for the development of ADUs. Initially, crowdfunding presented 
potential to overcome some of the limitations previously discussed. However, the 
findings of the Alley Flat proforma demonstrate that under current conditions, the real 
estate crowdfunding platform models studied offer no opportunities for the Alley Flat 
model to find funding consistent with its goals. The financing offered by real estate 
investment crowdfunding platforms has short-term paybacks that limit legacy 
homeownership affordability and favor a “fix-and-flip” approach to ADU development. 
Further research that compares real estate crowdfunding financing models to traditional 
means of real estate financing may provide a better picture of the crowdfunding financing 
sector. Many questions remain to be answered including, what kinds of developers are 
benefitting from real estate crowdfunding? And is the real estate crowdfunding model a 
predatory lending model similar to the payday loan model?  
While these questions and considerations apply to the larger context of real estate 
development and its relationship to crowdfunding financing, crowdfunding platforms 
focused on projects and organizations with social and environmental agendas may offer a 
window of opportunity for alternative financing to the Alley Flat model. Platforms such 
as iOby or Kiva may be the appropriate platforms to seek alternative funding for projects 




crowdfunding platforms do not offer the appropriate long-term and preferential financing 
conditions for projects with affordability in mind. Until leading real estate crowdfunding 
platforms, such as those included in this research, in the equity and peer-to-peer lending 
sectors provide alternative financing conditions and pre-qualification requirements to 
special projects, such as Alley Flats, they will not deliver feasible financing packages for 






Real Estate Development: industry sector and business activities related to activities 
surrounding the dealing of real estate property, buildings or land. Real Estate 
Development can involve the selling, buying or leasing of real estate property, and the 
entire process of completion of a built project, from conception through funding, 
construction and completion.  
Community-oriented Real Estate Development: refers to the sector of the real estate 
development industry dedicated to projects related to serving social purposes in local 
communities. Community-oriented Real Estate Development projects, such as affordable 
housing, are typically initiated and executed by not-for-profit organizations or social 
entrepreneurs.  
Ad-hoc Real Estate Development: refers to sectors of the real estate investment industry 
related to projects of small scale and for individual property owner interest and benefit. 
These projects are not large in scale but shape most of the development in existing 
communities: they are owner initiated and operated. Projects include renovations and 
additions to existing properties and grounds.   
Auxiliary Dwelling Units (ADUs): also known as granny flats, in-law unit, casita, 
backyard cottages, secondary dwelling units (SDU), carriage houses, back houses and 
many other terms, ADUs are a form of small and self-contained urban infill housing.  
ADUs share site with and function independently from a larger single-family unit.   
The Alley Flat Initiative (AFI): a collaboration between University of Texas Center for 
Sustainable development, Guadalupe Neighborhood Development Corporation, and the 
Austin Community Design and Development Center that started in the early 2000s. The 
goal of the Initiative is to create flexible and self-perpetuating delivery system for 




Reasonably Affordable Rental ADUs: property owners who are part of the AFI benefit 
from reduced professional design fees and City of Austin express permitting and fee 
exemptions in exchange from a commitment to preserve the ADU unit rental “reasonably 
affordable”. Affordability standards are set by City of Austin S.M.A.R.T. Housing policy. 
As of 2016, S.M.A.R.T. Housing minimum standard for reasonable affordable rental 
rates is set according to Median Family Income (MFI) in the Austin-San Marcos MSA. 
At least for the first 5 years of rental, an Alley Flat should be rented to families earning 
no more than 80% MFI, and rates should not exceed 30% of the family’s income.   
Legacy homeowner properties: property owners in East Austin neighborhoods of 
Chestnut, Rosewood, Holly and East Cesar Chavez, whose property deeds have not 
changed between 1992 and 2002, and continued unchanged since, according to TCAD 
tax assessment data. Many of them hold property of their homestead prior to 1992.  Since 
they are long-time residents of their communities, they are assumed to have chosen to 
live in East Austin because of the affordability of the area at the time. As such, and as 
findings suggest, they are homeowners at risk of moving from their homesteads due to 
affordability pressures. The financial model of this research is based upon assumptions 
from this group of homeowners in Austin.   
Crowdfunding: financial contributions from a large number of online investors, sponsors 
or donors to finance for-profit or non-profit initiatives or enterprises. 
Patron Crowdfunding: form of crowdfunding by which those involved are funding a 
project or initiative as a philanthropic action. Two major trends are noticeable in patron 
crowdfunding (1) the donation-type, and (2) the reward-based mode—where donations 
are rewarded by some kind of recognition, product or credit upon completion of funding 
for the project.   
Equity Crowdfunding: form of crowdfunding by which investors are given equity, they 
own a portion of the business, and will perceive the returns or losses of the venture 




Peer-to-peer Lending or Debt Crowdfunding: form of crowdfunding by which those 
involved become issuers of funding in the form of debt and are guaranteed payments set 
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APPENDIX 4: ZILLOW HOME VALUE INDEX METHODOLOGY 
 




Before we tackle the Zillow Home Value Index, be sure to learn about the Zestimate home 
valuation, since this is the building block for the Zillow Home Value Index. A Zestimate is 
Zillow's estimate of the current market value for a home. We have tens of millions of 
Zestimates - one for most homes. Our data is refreshed regularly to reflect real estate 
transactions that could affect you - even if you're not buying or selling a house. 
 
OK, so what's the Zillow Home Value Index? 
 
The Zillow Home Value Index is the median Zestimate valuation for a given geographic area 
on a given day. 
 




Essentially, it is the middle point. Exactly half the Zestimates for a region are below this 
number and half the Zestimates are above it. It is expressed in dollars and is for a particular 
geographic region (e.g., Zillow Home Value Index = $125,441 forBaltimore on Aug. 18, 
2009). 
 
Can you give me another example? 
 
Sure. Let's take Seattle. On Aug. 19, 2009, the Zillow Home Value Index for single-family 
homes in Seattle was $373,714, which means half the homes have values less than $373,714 
and half have values greater than $373,714. 
 
So, how do you create the Zillow Home Value Index? 
 
With lots of data. For example, suppose there are 101 homes in your county. Zillow would 
create a Zestimate for each of these homes. We then arrange all 101 Zestimates from lowest 
value to highest and, starting from the smallest value, we would pick the middle one - the 
51st - and this would be the Zillow Home Value Index for your county on that particular day. 
 
What's the difference between this and averaging the figures? Wouldn't that be more 





The median Zestimate is much less sensitive to extreme values than the average Zestimate 




$230,000, $232,000, $242,000, $243,000, $250,000 
 
In this series of Zestimate numbers above, the Zillow Home Value Index is $242,000 (the 





$230,000, $232,000, $242,000, $243,000, $923,000 
 
If you change just one number by a large amount, it skews the data. In the numbers above, 
the Zillow Home Value Index is still $242,000, but the average is now $374,000. Therefore, 
the median of $242,000 is arguably a better representation of all five numbers than is the 
average of $374,000. 
 
Since housing data has lots of extreme values in it, the median is a better representation of the 
general level of the housing market than the average. 
 
Where do you get the data to create the Zillow Home Value Index? 
 
We receive this data from counties and other municipalities, though not all jurisdictions make 
it available. However, we are adding data all the time. So be sure to check back. 
 
How does the Zillow Home Value Index affect my home? 
 
In many ways! If the Zillow Home Value Index for your county is $215,000 today and was 
$210,000 yesterday, this means that a typical home in your area is worth more today than 
yesterday. So, if you're thinking of selling, you can evaluate your own home relative to the 
surrounding market, or if you're buying, you can learn what's happening in other markets. 
 
How is neighborhood appreciation calculated? 
 
The rate of appreciation on these levels of geography - ZIP code, county, state, U.S. - is 
based on the Zillow Home Value Index. Cumulative appreciation is the simple ratio between 
today's Zillow Home Value Index and the Index for a reference period (e.g., the Zillow Home 
Value Index one, five or 10 years ago). 
 





The Zillow Home Value Index is updated at the same time that we update Zestimates. These 
updates reflect new real estate transactions that affect an area's Zillow Home Value Index. 
 
Is the Zillow Home Value Index the best indicator of tracking real estate markets? 
 
We feel it is, because with the Zestimate, we have an estimate of the current value of every 
home in the area and, thus, can estimate what the median sale price of the whole area would 
be if every home were sold on the same day: It would approximately equal the median 
Zestimate, or Zillow Home Value Index for that area. 
 
If someone didn't use the Zillow Home Value Index, what would they use? 
 
One popular method is using the median sale price of homes over a certain period of time, 
such as a month. While interesting, this measure is problematic because it is influenced by 
the mix of housing sold in the period of time associated with the metric. 
 
For example, if high-end homes were not selling very well, but mid-range homes were, then 
the median sale price will be lower than it should be. It will not be an accurate reflection of 
the "general" level of home values because the median is taken from the set of mid-range 
home sales that happened in the period, ignoring the high-end homes that didn't sell. The 
median sale price would be a perfectly accurate reflection of home values in an area if every 
home were bought and sold in the particular time period. Since this is highly unlikely, the 
median sale price is biased to the extent that the homes sold in a given period are not 
completely representative of all the homes in the area. 
 
OK, I think I got it. So, how do I find the Zillow Home Value Index for where I live? 
 
Go to the "Homes" tab and enter your address. Then click on the address in the map bubble, 
then "See home info," the "Zestimate & Charts." The Zillow Home Value Index is located 
under "How This Home Stacks Up." Remember -- a Zillow Home Value Index can apply to 
the following geographic levels: ZIP code, city, county, state and U.S.  
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